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NOTES
The Food Quality Protection Act of 1996: Replacing Old
Impracticalities with New Uncertainties in Pesticide Regulation
It is our alarming misfortune that so primitive a science has
armed itself with the most modem and terrible weapons, and
that in turning them against the insects it has also turned them
against the earth.1
I. INTRODUCrION
The pesticides that concerned Rachel Carson over thirty years
ago still remain in our environment in large quantities. According to
1991 estimates, farmers in the United States use 700 million pounds
of pesticides every year. Because these chemicals are designed to
kill living organisms, they present a risk not just to pests but also to
people, wildlife, and the environment.' Pesticides contribute to a
number of health problems, including birth defects and cancer, and
can prove fatal.4
Although potentially deadly, pesticides provide significant bene-
fits to society. By controlling pests that threaten crops, pesticides
increase crop yields, leading to a better agricultural economy and
lower food prices.' They also ensure the availability of a well-
balanced diet and control disease-carrying pests.6 Because of these
benefits, pesticides play an important role in modern agriculture, but
their dangers necessitate government regulation.
In regulating pesticides, the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") generally takes into account their risks and benefits.7 The
1. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 297 (1962).
2. See RESOURCES, COMMUNITY, AND ECON. DEv. DIv., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, GAO/RCED-92-32, PESTICIDES: BETTER DATA CAN IMPROVE THE USE-
FULNESS OF EPA'S BENEFIT ASSESSMENTS 16 (1991) [hereinafter GAO, BETTER DATA].
3. See id
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. This type of analysis is called risk-benefit analysis. See generally Richard Zeck-
hauser, Measuring Risks and Benefits of Food Safety Decisions, 38 VAND. L. REV. 539,
545-49 (1985) (describing risk-benefit analysis within the context of food safety regula-
tion).
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two major laws under which the EPA regulates pesticides, the Fed-
eral Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA")8 and the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FFDCA"), both contain
risk-benefit standards." Until recently, a notable exception to the use
of risk-benefit standards was a provision in FFDCA prohibiting, in
processed food, pesticide residues that carried any risk of inducing
cancer. Known as the Delaney Clause," the provision proved im-
practical and subjected pesticides used on processed and unprocessed
foods to inconsistent standards.13 In response to these problems, in
1988 the EPA adopted a policy excepting from the Delaney Clause
pesticides with insignificant cancer risks,14 but in 1992 a federal court
of appeals ruling overturned the EPA's policy for violating the plain
meaning of the Clause. 5
After several failed attempts, 6 Congress finally reformed the
Delaney Clause by passing the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996
8. 7 U.S.C. § 136-136y (1994), amended by Food Quality Protection Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-170, §§ 101-305, 501, 110 Stat. 1489, 1489-1513, 1536-38. For a descrip-
tion of FIFRA, see infra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
9. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-95 (1994), amended by Food Quality Protection Act §§ 401-07,
110 Stat. at 1513-36. FFDCA governs pesticide residues in food. For a description of
FFDCA, see infra notes 38-64 and accompanying text.
10. FIFRA instructs the EPA, prior to the registration of a pesticide, to consider its
"risk to man or the environment, taking into account the economic, social, and environ-
mental costs and benefits" of its use. 7 U.S.C.A. § 136(bb) (West Supp. 1996); see 7
U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5) (1994). FFDCA requires pesticide residues in raw food to be "safe,"
taking into account "the necessity for the production of an adequate, wholesome, and
economical food supply." 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b) (1994), amended by Food Quality Protec-
tion Act § 405, 110 Stat. at 1514-35.
11. See 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A). The provision prohibited carcinogenic food addi-
tives, and prior to the Food Quality Protection Act's amendments, FFDCA defined
pesticide residues in processed food as food additives. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (1994),
amended by Food Quality Protection Act § 402(b), 110 Stat. at 1513. For a discussion of
the Food Quality Protection Act's changes to FFDCA's food additives definition, see
infra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
12. The Clause was named for Representative James Delaney, who championed its
inclusion in FFDCA. See Douglas T. Sheehy, A De Minimis Exception to the Delaney
Clause: A Reassessment of Les v. Reilly, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 257,260-61 (1995).
13. See infra notes 65-80 and accompanying text (describing the problems created by
the Delaney Clause).
14. See Regulation of Pesticides in Food: Addressing the Delaney Paradox Policy
Statement, 53 Fed. Reg. 41,104,41,104 (1988) [hereinafter Delaney Policy Statement]; see
also infra notes 81-92 and accompanying text (describing the EPA's policy).
15. See Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985, 990 (9th Cir. 1992); see also infra notes 95-100 and
accompanying text (describing Les).
16. For a discussion of the congressional attempts to reform the Delaney Clause prior
to the enactment of Food Quality Protection Act, see infra notes 101-135 and accompa-
nying text.
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("FQPA").17 The Act creates a risk-benefit standard for all pesticide
residues in food,'8 thereby negating the problems caused by the De-
laney Clause's zero-risk standard. However, risk-benefit analysis is
subject to the uncertainties involved in measuring risks and benefits, 9
and many of the new requirements that FQPA places on the EPA's
tolerance-setting process may add to those uncertainties.'
This Note explores the context, meaning, and significance of
FQPA, focusing on its new risk-benefit standard for all pesticide
residues in food. Part II describes the pre-FQPA federal regulatory
framework for pesticides,2' the problems caused by the Delaney
Clause's zero-risk standard for carcinogenic pesticide residues,' ad-
ministrative and judicial interpretations of the Clause, 2 and the
congressional efforts to reform it, culminating in FQPA.24  Part III
explains FQPA's provisions, particularly the new uniform standard
for pesticide residues in raw and processed foods.2' Finally, Part IV
analyzes FQPA's risk-benefit standard, providing background on
risk-benefit analysis2 and discussing the uncertainties involved in as-
sessing pesticide risks and benefits.2
17. Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489 (codified at 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 136-136y and 21
U.S.C.A. §§ 301-382 (West Supp. 1996)); see also infra notes 136-64 and accompanying
text (describing FQPA).
18. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 346a(b)(2) (West Supp. 1996); see also infra notes 142-56
(describing FQPA's risk-benefit standard).
19. See infra notes 248-320 and accompanying text (discussing potential problems
with FQPA's risk-benefit standard). The issues surrounding risk-benefit assessment are
germane to many other areas of environmental law besides pesticide regulation because
risk assessment is a common regulatory tool in the environmental field. For a general
discussion of the use of risk assessment under other federal and state laws, see March
Sadowitz & John D. Graham, A Survey of Residual Cancer Risks Permitted by Health,
Safety and Environmental Policy, 6 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY, & ENV'T 17 (1995). Most
environmental laws other than those concerned with pesticides only consider health risks
and do not use risk-benefit analysis. See Amy Montemarano, Note, The Delaney Paradox
Resurfaces: Regulating Pesticides as Food Additives Under Federal Law, 25 RUTGERS L.J.
433, 457-58 n.116 (1994) (citing Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp.
IV 1992); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992);
Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
20. See infra note 246 (listing the new requirements creating added uncertainty). As
this Note was being published, the EPA issued guidelines detailing how it plans to imple-
ment FQPA's requirements. See infra note 332.
21. See infra notes 30-64 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 65-80 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 81-100 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 101-35 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 136-64 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 170-240 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 241-320 and accompanying text.
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II. HISTORY BEHIND THE FOOD QUALITY PROTECrION ACT
FQPA amends portions of two important pesticide laws: the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Acts and the Fed-
eral Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.29 FIFRA regulates pesticides in
general, while FFDCA regulates pesticide residues in food. To-
gether, FIFRA and FFDCA form the regulatory framework for
pesticides used on food products. FQPA is the culmination of years
of failed congressional attempts to reform one of FFDCA's contro-
versial provisions, the Delaney Clause.
A. Federal Pesticide Regulation
1. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
Congress enacted FIFRA in 1947,30 but it did not create the Act's
major regulatory provisions until 1972." FIFRA's foremost provision
is its registration system for all pesticides in use in the country. 2 Un-
der FIFRA, a pesticide must be registered with the EPA before it
may be sold or distributed.3 A registration applicant must submit
certain information with its application, including a statement of
claims about the pesticide's proposed use, the data upon which those
claims are based, the pesticide's formula, and a request for classifica-
tion.' The EPA Administrator must approve the registration request
if the required submissions are complete, the pesticide is accurately
labeled, and the Administrator judges that the pesticide will not
cause "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment."'3 In mak-
28. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1994), amended by Food Quality Protection Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-170, §§ 101-305,501, 110 Stat. 1489, 1489-1513, 1536-38.
29. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-95 (1994), amended by Food Quality Protection Act §§ 401-07,
110 Stat. at 1513-36.
30. Pub. L. No. 80-104, 61 Stat. 163 (1947) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.A.
§§ 136-136y (West 1980 & Supp. 1996)).
31. See Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-516,86 Stat. 973
(1972) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 136-136y (West 1980 & Supp. 1996)).
32. See 7 U.S.C. § 136a (1994), amended by Food Quality Protection Act §§ 105-06,
210,222-24,231, 250, 110 Stat. at 1490-92,1493-1502,1503-07, 1508,1510-11.
33. See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a). FIFRA contains civil and criminal penalties for violations
of the Act: The Administrator may impose a civil penalty of up to $5000 for each viola-
tion, and knowing violators may receive a criminal penalty of up to $50,000 in fines and
one year in prison. See id. § 1361.
34. See id. § 136a(c)(1), amended by Food Quality Protection Act §§ 210(b), 250(1),
110 Stat. at 1494-95, 1510-11. FIFRA exempts certain types of pesticides from its applica-
tion requirements, including experimental pesticides, see id. § 136a(b)(2), and pesticides
used by any state or federal agency in an emergency, see id. § 136p.
35. Id. § 136a(c)(5)(C). Upon approval, the Administrator must classify a pesticide
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ing her determination, the Administrator must weigh "the economic,
social, and environmental costs and benefits" of the pesticide's use.36
This type of analysis is called risk-benefit analysis-balancing a pesti-
cide's health and environmental risks against the benefits of its use."
2. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
While FIFRA governs pesticide use, FFDCA regulates pesticide
residues in food. FFDCA, passed in 1938, prescribes requirements
for the labeling and contents of food and food additives, drugs, and
cosmetics.' The EPA has authority over FFDCA's application to
pesticides." Under FFDCA, the Administrator must establish
"tolerances" for the chemical residues left on food products from
pesticide spraying.4° Food containing a pesticide residue for which
the Administrator has not approved a tolerance is deemed
"adulterated" and is prohibited by the Act.4' EPA regulations also
prohibit the registration of a pesticide under FIFRA until the EPA
establishes all necessary tolerances for the chemical under FFDCA.42
Prior to FQPA's changes, FFDCA regulated pesticide residues
for either general or restricted use. See id. § 136a(d)(1). If classified for restricted use, a
pesticide may only be used "by or under the direct supervision of a certified applicator."
Id. § 136a(d)(1)(C)(i). FIFRA empowers the EPA to establish training and examination
requirements for certified applicators. See id. § 136i. The Administrator may change a
pesticide's classification, or suspend or cancel its registration in the event that she finds
that the pesticide is no longer safe. See id. § 136d(b)-(c), amended by Food Quality Pro-
tection Act §§ 102,233, 110 Stat. at 1489,1509.
36. Id. § 136(bb), amended by Food Quality Protection Act § 230(a), 110 Stat. at
1508.
37. See Zeckhauser, supra note 7, at 545-49.
38. See Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.A.
§§ 301-95 (West 1972 & Supp. 1996)).
39. See Delaney Policy Statement, supra note 14, at 41,106 n.2 ("Under Reorganiza-
tion Plan No. 3 of 1970, which established EPA, the authority to set tolerances for
pesticide chemicals.., was transferred from FDA to EPA.").
40. See 21 U.S.C. § 346a (1994), amended by Food Quality Protection Act § 405, 110
Stat. at 1514-35. A tolerance "is the maximum amount of pesticide residue that is allowed
by law to remain in or on raw agricultural commodities." RESOURCES, COMMUNITY,
AND ECON. DEV. DIV., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/T-RCED-92-33, FOOD
SAFETY: DIFFICULTIES IN ASSESSING PESTICIDE RISKS AND BENEFITS 3 (1992)
[hereinafter GAO, FOOD SAFETY]. The Administrator may establish a tolerance in re-
sponse to a petition from a pesticide manufacturer or user, see 21 U.S.C. § 346a(d),
amended by Food Quality Protection Act § 405, 110 Stat. at 1514-35, or on her own initia-
tive, see id. § 346a(e), amended by Food Quality Protection Act § 405, 110 Stat. at 1514-
35.
41. See 21 U.S.C. § 342(a), amended by Food Quality Protection Act § 404, 110 Stat.
at 1514. FFDCA prohibits the sale of adulterated food. See id. § 331(a).
42. See Pesticide Registration and Classification Procedures, 40 C.F.R. §§ 152.112(g),
152.113(a)(3), 152.114(c) (1996).
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in raw and processed food under different schemes. Section 408,
added to FFDCA in 1954, regulated residues in raw food.43 It pro-
vided that the Administrator should set tolerances for residues "to
the extent necessary to protect the public health," taking into consid-
eration "the other ways in which the consumer may be affected by
the same pesticide chemical or by other related substances that are
poisonous or deleterious."" This section also established a risk-
benefit comparison similar to the one in FIFRA by instructing the
Administrator to consider "the necessity for the production of an
adequate, wholesome, and economical food supply" when deciding
whether to approve a tolerance.45 FFDCA section 409, added in 1958,
applied to pesticide residues in processed food.' This section regu-
lates food additives, and prior to the enactment of FQPA, FFDCA
defined pesticide residues in processed food as food additives.47 Sec-
tion 409 directed the Administrator to establish "safe" tolerances for
residues in processed food.' When setting these tolerances, the Act
instructed the Administrator to consider cumulative exposure to
residues and appropriate safety factors.49 Unlike section 408, section
409 did not expressly provide for the consideration of a chemical's
benefits, but the EPA interpreted the general safety clause as allow-
ing such a consideration. The EPA implemented FFDCA sections
408 and 409 in accordance with its "coordination policy," under
which the EPA would not grant a section 408 raw food tolerance for
any pesticide residue failing to qualify for a section 409 processed
food tolerance.5"
43. See Miller Pesticide Amendments, Pub. L. No. 83-518, § 3, 68 Stat. 511, 511
(1954) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.A. § 346a (West 1972 & Supp. 1996)).
44. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b), amended by Food Quality Protection Act § 405, 110 Stat. at
1514-35.
45. Id.
46. See Food Additives Amendment of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-929, § 4, 72 Stat. 1784,
1785-89 (1958) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 348 (1994)).
47. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(s), amended by Food Quality Protection Act § 402(b), 110
Stat. at 1513. The Act's definition of food additive excluded pesticide residues in raw
food, but not pesticide residues in processed food. See id.
48. See 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A).
49. See id. § 348(c)(5).
50. See Delaney Policy Statement, supra note 14, at 41,106 ("The general safety
clause ... has been construed by the Agency to allow the weighing of benefits and risks
when issuing food additive regulations.").
51. See Section 409 Tolerances; Response to Petition Requesting Revocation of Food
Additive Regulations, 55 Fed. Reg. 17,560, 17,562 (1990) [hereinafter Section 409 Toler-
ances]. The EPA referred to this policy as the coordination policy in later notices. See,
e.g., Pesticides; Request for Comment on Petition to Modify EPA Policy on Pesticide
Tolerances, 58 Fed. Reg. 7470, 7473 (1993) [hereinafter Request for Comment]. The
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Not all pesticide residues in processed food required tolerances
under section 409. According to FFDCA's "flow-through" provi-
sion,52 a residue from a pesticide applied prior to processing did not
require a section 409 tolerance if the residue was "removed to the
extent possible in good manufacturing practice" and "the concentra-
tion of such residue in the processed food when ready to eat [was] not
greater than the tolerance prescribed for the raw agricultural com-
modity [under section 408].""3 In interpreting FFDCA's flow-through
provision, however, the EPA focused on the fact that a residue's con-
centration increased during processing, rather than the level of
concentration. 4 The Agency required a section 409 tolerance when-
ever the concentration of pesticide residues in raw food increased
during processing, even if the concentrated level of those residues did
not exceed the section 408 tolerance level.55
FFDCA section 409 contained the Delaney Clause, prohibiting
carcinogenic food additives, including pesticide residues.56 The
EPA justified the coordination policy on the grounds that if the Agency approved a pesti-
cide residue under section 408 for raw food, but not under section 409 for processed food,
it would cause "uncertainty in the marketplace"-farmers would not know whether they
could use the pesticide because they would not know in advance whether their crops
eventually would be sold raw or processed. See Section 409 Tolerances, supra, at 17,562.
Some commentators criticized the coordination policy, claiming that it violated the stan-
dards established under FFDCA section 408, conflicted with the plain language of the
flow-through provision, and ignored the legislative history of section 409. See, e.g., Ed-
ward Dunkelberger & Richard A. Merrill, The Delaney Paradox Reexamined: Regulating
Pesticides in Processed Foods, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 411,430-38 (1993); see also Request
for Comment, supra, at 7470-75 (containing the EPA's response to a petition to change its
coordination policy).
52. See 21 U.S.C. § 342(a), amended by Food Quality Protection Act § 404, 110 Stat.
at 1514. Flow-through is the term used to refer to this provision by both by the EPA, see,
e.g., Request for Comment, supra note 51, at 7472, and commentators, see, e.g., Dunkel-
berger & Merrill, supra note 51, at 414.
53. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a), amended by Food Quality Protection Act § 404, 110 Stat. at
1514.
54. See BOARD ON AGRICULTURE, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, REGULATING
PESTICIDES IN FOOD: THE DELANEY PARADOX 28 (1987) [hereinafter NRC,
REGULATING PESTICIDES].
55. See id. Processes applied to raw food, like drying, milling, or juicing, may cause
pesticide residues in the raw food to concentrate in the food's processed form. See id.
The EPA set section 408 tolerances according to the highest possible levels of residues on
raw food, but actual residue levels at harvest are often lower because of lower application
rates and dissipation. See id. Therefore, pesticide residues might concentrate during
processing, yet still not exceed the tolerance levels set under section 408. See id. Some
commentators criticized the EPA's approach as overly strict. See, e.g., Dunkelberger &
Merrill, supra note 51, at 415. The EPA's approach differed from that of the FDA prior
to 1970, when the FDA had jurisdiction over sections 408 and 409. See id. at 427-28. The
FDA focused on the level of concentration, exempting from section 409 pesticide residues
in processed food lower than the section 408 tolerance level. See id. at 427.
56. See 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A). FFDCA contains two other provisions similar to
1997] 1375
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Clause stated:
[N]o additive shall be deemed to be safe [under section 409]
if it is found to induce cancer when ingested by man or ani-
mal, or if it is found, after tests which are appropriate for
the evaluation of the safety of food additives, to induce can-
cer in man or animal.s
The Delaney Clause had a significant impact on pesticide regula-
tion. Because the Clause barred the EPA from issuing a tolerance
under section 409 for a carcinogenic pesticide residue that concen-
trated in processed food, the EPA, under its coordination policy, also
declined to set a section 408 raw food tolerance for such a chemical.58
The EPA essentially "read the Delaney Clause into section 408,"" in
contradiction to section 408's risk-benefit standard." Furthermore, in
accordance with EPA regulations," without a tolerance under
FFDCA the EPA would not register the chemical under FIFRA,2
although FIFRA also instructed the EPA to base its registration deci-
sions on a risk-benefit calculation.3  Thus, for a carcinogenic
pesticide, the Delaney Clause controlled FIFRA's registration proc-
ess as well.'
The practical ramifications of FFDCA's old pesticide regulation
system were as follows:
* A pesticide used on raw food that was never processed only
required a section 408 tolerance. When deciding whether to approve
a tolerance, FFDCA instructed the EPA to take into account the pes-
the Delaney Clause; one bars carcinogenic color additives, see ic § 379e(b)(5)(B), and
the other bars animal drugs, see id. § 360b(d)(1)(I), in food.
57. Id. § 348(c)(3)(A).
58. See Section 409 Tolerances, supra note 51, at 17,562.
59. Dunkelberger & Merrill, supra note 51, at 430.
60. Section 408 directed the Administrator to set tolerances for pesticide residues in
raw food "to the extent necessary to protect the public health," taking into consideration
"the necessity for the production of an adequate, wholesome, and economical food sup-
ply." 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b), amended by Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-70, § 405, 110 Stat. 1489, 1514-35; see supra text accompanying note 45 (discussing
risk-benefit standard set by section 408 prior to FQPA).
61. See Pesticide Registration and Classification Procedure, 40 C.F.R. §§ 152.112(g),
152.113(a)(3), 152.114(c) (1996).
62. See Section 409 Tolerances, supra note 51, at 17,562.
63. The Administrator must determine that a pesticide will not cause "unreasonable
adverse effects on the environment," 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5) (1994), defined as "any unrea-
sonable risk to man or the environment, taking into account the economic, social, and
environmental costs and benefits of the use of any pesticide," id. § 136(bb), amended by
Food Quality Protection Act § 230(a), 110 Stat. at 1508; see supra notes 35-37 and ac-
companying text (discussing FIFRA's risk-benefit standard).
64. See Section 409 Tolerances, supra note 51, at 17,562.
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ticide's dietary risks and its benefits.
* A pesticide used on raw food that might be processed, but that
did not concentrate during processing, also only required a section
408 tolerance. Again, FFDCA instructed the EPA to base its deci-
sion on section 408's risk-benefit comparison.
* A pesticide used on raw food that might be processed, and
that did concentrate during processing, required both section 408 and
section 409 tolerances. If the pesticide was noncarcinogenic, FFDCA
instructed the EPA to use risk-benefit comparisons under both sec-
tions, and the Delaney Clause did not apply. However, if the
pesticide was carcinogenic, the Delaney Clause prohibited the EPA
from establishing a section 409 tolerance for it, regardless of its level
of risk or its benefits. Furthermore, the EPA's coordination policy
prevented the Agency from setting a section 408 tolerance for the
pesticide, and EPA regulations directed the Agency to cancel the
pesticide's FIFRA registration.
* A pesticide used on food during or after processing required a
section 409 tolerance. FFDCA instructed the EPA to use a risk-
benefit comparison to decide whether to approve the tolerance.
However, if the pesticide was carcinogenic, the Delaney Clause pro-
hibited the EPA from setting a tolerance for the residue, and Agency
regulations directed the EPA to cancel the pesticide's registration.
B. Criticism of the Delaney Clause
The Delaney Clause received much criticism.' One set of criti-
cisms stemmed from the regulatory inconsistency the Clause
created-the "Delaney Paradox."" Because of the Delaney Clause,
FFDCA established differing standards for carcinogenic pesticide
residues in raw and processed foods: While the EPA was able to set
65. For general criticism of the Clause, see NRC, REGULATING PESTICIDES, supra
note 54, at 40-43; Sheehy, supra note 12, at 275-79; Montemarano, supra note 19, at 435-
39. Opinions of the Delaney Clause were not universally negative. Proponents praised it
for "lack[ing] the compromised and ambiguous form normally associated with an act of
Congress," William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Seven Statutory Wonders of U.S. Environmental
Law: Origins and Morphology, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1009, 1014 (1994), and credited it
with "bringing down DDT and putting in motion a worldwide social revolution against the
serious problem of pesticide pollution," iL at 1011. Additionally, proponents claimed
that the Clause brought "toxicology, epidemiology, and other sciences ... to bear in the
real world of risk assessment." Id. at 1018. Some contend that the Clause would be work-
able if the EPA used a strict scientific standard to determine whether a pesticide induces
cancer. See, e.g., Frederick H. Degnan & W. Gary Flamm, Living With and Reforming the
Delaney Clause, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 235,248-55 (1995).
66. See, e.g., NRC, REGULATING PESTICIDES, supra note 54, at 40-43; Sheehy, supra
note 12, at 278-79; Montemarano, supra note 19, at 437.
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tolerances for carcinogenic residues in raw food under section 408's
risk-benefit approach, section 409 fixed a zero-risk standard for such
residues in processed food. 7 A 1987 study of the Delaney Clause was
"unable to identify any sound scientific or policy reason for regulat-
ing pesticides present in or on raw commodities differently than those
present on processed foods.""8 In addition, the Clause prevented
farmers from replacing older, more dangerous pesticides with newer,
safer alternatives. Older pesticides underwent more primitive scien-
tific testing that may have failed to detect their carcinogenicity, while
subsequent advances in science have allowed researchers to identify
more minute levels of carcinogens in newer pesticides. 9 Conse-
quently, new pesticides with very small levels of risk nonetheless
violated the Delaney Clause, forcing farmers to continue to use older
and potentially more dangerous pesticides.0
Critics also contended that the Delaney Clause might have a
negative effect on public health. They feared it might significantly
reduce the number of available pesticides, resulting in increased
farming costs and reduced crop yields.7' These restrictions in the
food supply would cause higher food prices and reduced food avail-
ability, preventing consumers from obtaining the foods necessary for
a well-balanced diet.72
Finally, a 1987 National Research Council ("NRC") report indi-
cated that the Delaney Clause was not the most effective way to
reduce carcinogenic risk from pesticide residues in the food supply.'
67. See Montemarano, supra note 19, at 437-38. For a description of the differing
requirements of FFDCA sections 408 and 409, see supra notes 43-64 and accompanying
text.
68. NRC, REGULATING PESTICIDES, supra note 54, at 40.
69. See iL at 41. These advances also have improved researchers' ability to detect
increases in pesticide concentrations in food during processing, making it more likely that
the EPA will recognize the need for section 409 tolerances. See id.
70. See Sheehy, supra note 12, at 278; Montemarano, supra note 19, at 439. For some
time, the EPA avoided this negative public health consequence of the Delaney paradox
by excepting from the Clause carcinogenic pesticides with insignificant health risks. See
infra notes 81-92 and accompanying text.
71. See Sheehy, supra note 12, at 275. In 1985, the EPA estimated that 53 of the 289
pesticides then used on food were potentially carcinogenic, and therefore might violate
the Delaney Clause. See NRC, REGULATING PESTICIDES, supra note 54, at 50-51.
72. See Sheehy, supra note 12, at 276-78 (collecting and summarizing epidemiological
studies and showing links between dietary factors and cancer).
73. See NRC, REGULATING PESTICIDES, supra note 54, at 100-17. In 1985, the EPA
asked the NRC to study the impact of the Delaney Clause on pesticide regulation. See id.
at 1. The EPA was particularly concerned about the ramifications of strictly applying the
Clause to the large numbers of potentially carcinogenic pesticides already in use. See id.
at 2; see also id. at 50-51 (indicating that 53 of the 289 pesticides then used on food were
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Using the same risk analysis procedure employed by the EPA,74 the
NRC estimated the dietary risk posed by twenty-eight of the fifty-
three carcinogenic or potentially carcinogenic pesticides then in use.'
Comparing the Delaney Clause to an alternative uniform standard
that would bar pesticide residues with more than a 1/1,000,000 risk of
inducing cancer in both raw and processed foods, the NRC found that
the Delaney Clause only reduced dietary cancer risk by approxi-
mately 55%,76 while the uniform standard would reduce dietary risk
by 98%.' Furthermore, applying the Delaney Clause to all poten-
tially carcinogenic pesticides already in use would revoke 51% of
existing tolerances, while the uniform standard would only revoke
32% of existing tolerances. The NRC explained these significant
differences by reasoning that the uniform standard would operate
more efficiently, targeting the pesticide residues causing the highest
dietary risk in both raw and processed food." The results of its study
led the NRC to recommend a uniform "negligible risk standard" for
all pesticide residues.'
C. Administrative and Judicial Interpretation of the Delaney Clause
1. The EPA's De Minimis Exception
In response to the NRC's 1987 report, the EPA announced in
1988 that it would begin to apply a de minimis exception to the De-
laney Clause.8 The EPA observed that an agency may "avoid
applying the terms of a statute literally when to do so would yield
potentially carcinogenic). The 1987 report is the result of the NRC's study. See id. at 1.
74. For a description of the EPA's risk assessment procedure, see infra notes 170-240
and accompanying text.
75. See NRC, REGULATING PESTICIDES, supra note 54, at 50-83 (explaining the
study's methodology). These 53 pesticides were chemicals that had been approved in the
past, under more primitive scientific testing, but that the EPA had identified in 1985 as
being potentially carcinogenic. See id at 50.
76. See id. at 108-09.
77. See id. at 112.
78. See id.
79. See id. Because the uniform standard applied to all pesticide residues, not just
residues on processed food, it would affect pesticides used on 38% of all crops, as op-
posed to the mere 20% affected by the Delaney Clause. See id. However, the NRC
judged this difference to be "modest." See id at 114.
80. Id. at 12-14.
81. See Delaney Policy Statement, supra note 14, at 41,104. De minimis is shorthand
for de minimis non curat lex, meaning "the law does not concern itself with trifles." Public
Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (characterizing the doctrine as
"spar[ing] agency resources for more important matters").
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pointless results."" Citing the problems with a literal interpretation
of the Delaney Clause,' the EPA stated that it would approve, under
FFDCA section 409, any pesticide with a cancer risk of less than
1/1,000,000, and might approve riskier pesticides if their benefits
outweighed their risks."
In adopting this change, the EPA acknowledged that in Public
Citizen v. Young,' the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit had recently overturned the Food and Drug Administration's
("FDA") attempt to read a similar de minimis exception into
FFDCA's zero-risk standard for carcinogenic color additives." The
Public Citizen court held that the FDA's de minimis exception vio-
lated the "rigid" language of the statuteY The court found that the
provision's legislative history indicated congressional intent that the
standard be strictly applied.' Furthermore, the court indicated that
the zero-risk standard reflected public concern about cancer coupled
with a perception that color additives lacked "any great value."8 9
82. Delaney Policy Statement, supra note 14, at 41,107.
83. See id. at 41,108-09; see also supra notes 65-80 and accompanying text (discussing
the criticisms of the Delaney Clause).
84. See Delaney Policy Statement, supra note 14, at 41,112.
85. 831 F.2d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
86. See id at 1123. In 1960, Congress added the color additives provision to FFDCA.
See Color Additives Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-618, § 103, 74 Stat. 397, 398-403
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 379e (1994)). Like section 409, the color additives
provision prescribed factors for determining if an additive is "safe," stating that an addi-
tive would not be deemed safe if "found ... to induce cancer when ingested by man or
animal." 21 U.S.C. § 379e(b). While the EPA had jurisdiction over section 409, the FDA
enforced the color additives provision. See Degnan & Flamm, supra note 65, at 248. For
a discussion of the FDA's implementation of the Delaney Clause's color additives provi-
sion, see Margaret Gilhooley, Plain Meaning, Absurd Results and the Legislative Purpose:
The Interpretation of the Delaney Clause, 40 ADMIN. L. REv. 267,274-75 (1988); Richard
A. Merrill, FDA's Implementation of the Delaney Clause: Repudiation of Congressional
Choice or Reasoned Adaptation to Scientific Progress?, 5 YALE J. ON REo. 1, 6-9 (1988).
In 1986, the FDA approved two color additives for use in cosmetics, even though
they posed slight cancer risks. See Listing of D&C Red No. 19 For Use in Externally
Applied Drugs and Cosmetics, 51 Fed. Reg. 28,346, 28,348 (1986) [hereinafter Red No.
19]; Listing of D&C Orange No. 17 for Use in Externally Applied Drugs and Cosmetics,
51 Fed. Reg. 28,331,28,345 (1986) [hereinafter Orange No. 17]. The risks of the two dyes
causing cancer were 1/9,000,000 and 1/19,000,000,000 respectively. See Red No. 19, supra,
at 28,360; Orange No. 17, supra, at 28,345. The FDA stated that the risks were "so trivial
as to be effectively no risk," and concluded that the additives were safe. See Red No. 19,
supra, at 28,360; Orange No. 17, supra, at 28,344. The FDA also indicated that as a gen-
eral rule, it would regard any risk less than 1/1,000,000 as de minimis and except it from
the color additives provision's zero-risk standard. See Red No. 19, supra, at 28,362; Or-
ange No. 17, supra, at 28,344.
87. See Public Citizen, 831 F.2d at 1113.
88. See id. at 1113-17.
89. Id. at 1117.
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Significantly, the court limited its holding to the color additives pro-
visionY In a footnote to its opinion, the court stated that "the
operation of the food additive Delaney Clause raises complex issues
distinct from those of this appeal."9' In creating its de minimis inter-
pretation of section 409, the EPA relied on the Public Citizen court's
distinction between FFDCA's food additives and color additives pro-
visions.'
2. Les v. Reilly
Shortly after the EPA adopted the de minimis exception, a
group of organizations and individuals petitioned the Agency to re-
voke several tolerances for carcinogenic chemicals.93 Reiterating its
new interpretation of the Delaney Clause, the EPA refused the peti-
tioners' request for revocation of several of the tolerances listed in
the petition on the grounds that the chemicals posed only a negligible
risk of cancer.94 In Les v. Reilly,9s the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit overturned the EPA's de minimis standard.96 The court based
its decision on the "clear and mandatory" language of the Delaney
Clause, as well as the Clause's legislative historyY In its opinion, the
court agreed with the D.C. Circuit's reasoning in Public Citizen, and
concluded that a de minimis exception to the Clause was "'contrary
to law.' "' The court noted that the Clause "was enacted in response
to increasing public concern about cancer" and that its authors
"intended to ensure that no carcinogens, no matter. how small the
amount, would be introduced into food." 9 The EPA argued that its
de minimis standard was a more sensible approach to pesticide regu-
lation, but the court replied that it was up to Congress, not the EPA
or the courts, to reform the law.'
90. See id. at 1120 ("[W]e deal here only with the color additive Delaney Clause, not
the one for food additives."). Noting the greater importance of food additives and its
uncertainty regarding section 409's legislative history, the court stated that although
FFDCA's color additives and food additives provisions "have almost identical wording,
the context is clearly different." Id
91. Id. at 1118 n.13.
92. See Delaney Policy Statement, supra note 14, at 41,107.
93. See Section 409 Tolerances, supra note 51, at 17,560.
94. See id at 17,563-69.
95. 968 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1992).
96. See id. at 990.
97. Id. at 988-89.
98. Id. (citing Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108,1123 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
99. Id. at 989.
100. See id- at 990 ("If there is to be a change, it is for Congress to direct.").
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D. Legislative Efforts to Reform the Delaney Clause
Soon after Les v. Reilly the EPA indicated that it would have to
revoke tolerances for numerous widely used pesticides."' In response
to this pressure, Congress began to consider a number of proposals to
change the nation's pesticide laws. However, it took Congress sev-
eral years to pass FQPA. A number of factors contributed to
Congress' inability to act. First, members of Congress felt pressure
from the general public, who feared that pesticide reform would
threaten their health."2 Attempting to reconcile the varying interests
of chemical manufacturers, farmers, environmentalists, and consumer
advocates was also very difficult. 3 Furthermore, pesticide regulation
involved scientific and technical complexities that were difficult to
grasp, and pesticide reform covered a wide range of issues."' Finally,
jurisdiction over pesticide laws spanned eight congressional commit-
tees and four federal agencies, so coordinating reform efforts was
complicated and sometimes resulted in turf battles. 5
Congressional efforts to amend the Delaney Clause actually pre-
dated Les v. Reilly. Prior to the enactment of FQPA, the last signifi-
cant revision of federal pesticide law was the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act Amendments ("FIFRA") of 1988."6
101. See Sheehy, supra note 12, at 275 ("[The] EPA announced that about thirty-five
pesticides with a multitude of uses would be affected by the decision," representing "over
ten percent of the roughly 300 pesticides used on food crops in the United States."). The
EPA anticipated that the expected number of tolerance revocations would increase as
additional pesticide testing data became available. See id.
102. See Pesticide Rules Remain Unchanged, 48 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 212,212 (1992).
103. See id.
104. See iL
105. See id, The Senate committees "with jurisdiction included: Agriculture; Foreign
Relations; Labor and Human Resources; Environment and Public Works; and Commerce,
Science and Transportation." Id. The House committees were: Agriculture; Energy and
Commerce; and Foreign Affairs. See id. The four federal agencies with jurisdiction were
the EPA, the FDA, the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of Commerce.
See id.
106. Pub. L. No. 100-532, 102 Stat. 2654 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 136-
136y (West 1972 & Supp. 1996)). See generally Pamela A. Finegan, Comment, FIFRA
Lite: A Regulatory Solution or Part of the Pesticide Problem?, 6 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
615, 628-41 (1989) (describing and critiquing the 1988 FIFRA Amendments); Congress
Speeds Up Pesticide Testing, 44 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 139, 139 (1988) (describing the
background and legislative history of the 1988 Amendments). The main thrust of the
1988 FIFRA Amendments was to speed up the EPA's re-registration efforts. As of 1988,
less than two percent of the older chemicals in use had been subjected to modem testing.
See Congress Speeds Up Pesticide Testing, supra, at 139. The Amendments established a
schedule, consisting of five phases spanning a total of seven to nine years, for re-
registering any pesticides "containing any active ingredient contained in any pesticide
first registered before November 1, 1984." Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenti-
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Soon after the passage of the 1988 FIFRA amendments, lawmakers
turned their attention to the Delaney Clause. In 1989, Senator Ed-
ward Kennedy introduced Senate Bill 722,07 which would have
replaced FFDCA's regulatory structure, including the Delaney
Clause, with a negligible risk standard for pesticide residues in both
raw and processed foods."' The bill would have directed the EPA to
consider only health risks when setting pesticide tolerances, and it
would have allowed states to set stricter standards for pesticide resi-
dues." The Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee
approved the bill in 1990, but Bush Administration objections to the
measure prevented it from progressing any further."° The Admini-
stration wanted to allow the EPA to consider a pesticide's benefits, as
well as its risks, and it also wanted to prevent states from setting
standards that differed from federal standards.'
In 1993, the year following Les v. Reilly, Congress considered
three alternative proposals to reform the Delaney Clause."' Senator
Edward Kennedy and Representative Henry Waxman introduced a
cide Act Amendments § 102, 102 Stat. at 2655-63 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.A.
§ 136a-1 (West Supp. 1996)).
107. Food Safety Amendments of 1989, S. 722, 101st Cong. See generally Pesticide-
Residue Regulation Shelved, 46 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 358, 358 (1990) (describing the bill
and its legislative history).
108. Senate Bill 722 stated that:
[A] tolerance may be established for a pesticide chemical residue in or on a raw
agricultural commodity or a processed food only if the risk to human health, in-
cluding the health of identifiable population groups (such as infants and other
children) with special food consumption patterns, from dietary exposure to the
pesticide chemical residue is negligible.
S. 722 § 4(b)(2)(A)(i) (emphasis added). The bill defined "negligible risk" as the level of
exposure to a pesticide residue that would pose less than a 1/1,000,000 risk of inducing
cancer and that would not cause any other adverse health effects. See id.
109. See S. 722; see also Pesticide-Residue Regulation Shelved, supra note 107, at 358
(noting the absence of a provision allowing consideration of benefits and of a national
uniformity provision).
110. See Pesticide-Residue Regulation Shelved, supra note 107, at 358.
111. See id.
112. In 1992, the House Agriculture Committee's Subcommittee on Department Op-
erations, Research, and Foreign Agriculture passed a bill containing numerous
amendments to FIFRA, but no provisions related to the Delaney Clause. See Pesticide
Safety Improvement Act of 1991, H.R. 3742, 102d Cong.; see also Pesticide Rules Remain
Unchanged, supra note 102, at 212 (describing the bill and its legislative history). Among
other things, the bill would have preempted local regulation of pesticides and eased re-
quirements for minor use pesticides, which are pesticides used on crops other than wheat,
corn, soybeans, cotton, or rice. See Pesticide Rules Remain Unchanged, supra note 102, at
212 (describing various sections of H.R. 3742); see also infra note 138 (describing minor
use pesticides). Congress took no further action on H.R. 3742. See Pesticide Rules Re-
main Unchanged, supra note 102, at 212.
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bill' that would have created a uniform standard for pesticide toler-
ances, excluded benefits considerations from the EPA's tolerance-
setting process, and required special attention to children's exposure
to pesticides."4 The Clinton Administration recommended that Con-
gress replace FEDCA's current standard with a uniform standard
that, based only on health risks and not benefits, would only allow
pesticide residues posing a "reasonable certainty of no harm." ' 5 Fi-
nally, Representative Richard Lehman introduced FQPA for the first
time."6 Like the measure's final version, the bill would have replaced
FFDCA sections 408 and 409, including the Delaney Clause, with a
flexible uniform standard for evaluating a pesticide's residues based
on the chemical's risks and benefits."7 Congress took little action on
any of these proposals in 1993,1 and likewise failed to pass any re-
form in 1994."1
When the new Republican-controlled Congress convened in
1995, the chairs of the House Agriculture and Commerce Commit-
113. Pesticide Food Safety Act of 1993, S. 331, 103d Cong.; H.R. 872, 103d Cong.
(1993). The two bills were identical versions of the same measure. See generally No Ac-
tion Taken on Pesticide Regulation, supra note 113, at 230 (describing the bills and their
legislative history).
114. See No Action Taken on Pesticide Regulation, supra note 113, at 230 (referring to
S. 331 and H.R. 872). The bills' language, see S. 331 § 3(a); H.R. 872 § 3(a), closely re-
sembled the language in Senate Bill 722, Senator Kennedy's 1989 proposal, see Food
Safety Amendments of 1989, S. 722, 101st Cong. § 4(b)(2)(A)(i); see also supra note 108
(quoting language of S. 722). The bills' special protections for children stemmed from a
report concluding that children and infants faced an elevated dietary risk from pesticide
residues. See COMMITTEE ON PESTICIDES IN THE DIETS OF INFANTS AND CHILDREN,
NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PESTICIDES IN THE DIETS OF INFANTS AND CHILDREN 3-7
(1993). This report eventually shaped FQPA's provisions for children and infants. See
infra notes 154-56 and accompanying text (discussing FQPA's additional safety measures
for children).
115. No Action Taken on Pesticide Regulation, supra note 113, at 230.
116. See H.R. 1627, 103d Cong. (1993). The bill's initial supporters were farmers and
chemical manufacturers. See No Action Taken on Pesticide Regulation, 49 CONG. Q.
ALMANAC 229,230 (1993).
117. The bill would have required the Administrator to set a pesticide's tolerance at a
level "adequate to protect the public health," H.R. 1627 § 305(b)(2)(A), taking into ac-
count the adverse effects prevented by the pesticide, the health risks of alternative pest
controls, and the need for an adequate and economical food supply, see id. § 305(b)(2)(F).
118. See id A joint House-Senate committee did consider the Clinton Administra-
tion's proposals, but took no action. See id
119. See FIFRA Rewrite, 50 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 198, 198-99 (1994). The "farmer-
friendly" House Agriculture Subcommittee on Department Operations and Nutrition did
pass H.R. 1627, but it advanced no further in the 103d Congress. See id The House
passed a much narrower bill, Minor Crop Protection Act of 1994, H.R. 967, 103d Cong.,
merely providing for increased development of minor use pesticides, but the Senate failed
to take up the measure. See FIFRA Rewrite, supra, at 198-99.
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tees reintroduced H.R. 1627.22 The House accorded joint jurisdiction
over the bill to the two committees.' The Agriculture Committee
approved portions of the bill that would have shortened the EPA's
review process for potentially dangerous pesticides, required the
EPA to base restrictions on "significant evidence of a chemical's
health risk," and eased the registration process for certain pesticides
with special applications." However, the Commerce Committee
failed to act on its portion of the bill, which dealt with provisions to
reform FFDCA's tolerance standard, including the Delaney Clause.'2
On June 19, 1996, the House Agriculture Committee again con-
sidered its portions of H.R. 1627 and approved them with "little
debate."'24 The Commerce Committee's Health and Environment
Subcommittee took up the portions of the bill relating to FFDCA's
tolerance standard, but suspended its markup on July 11 to allow
members to conduct additional negotiations over the measure." A
week later, the legislators reached a compromise that the subcommit-
tee and the full Commerce Committee approved on July 17 "without
dissent."' 26 On July 23, the House passed the combined provisions
120. H.R. 1627, 104th Cong. (1995).
121. See David Hosansky, Pesticides Bill Advances in Agriculture Panel, 54 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 1500, 1500 (1996) [hereinafter Hosansky, Pesticides Bill].
122. Eileen Simpson, Panel OKs Pesticide Provisions, Puts Off Controversial Action,
53 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1841, 1841 (1995) (referring to various sections of H.R. 1627).
The special-use pesticides included minor use, antimicrobial, and public health pesticides.
See infra note 138 (describing these types of chemicals).
123. See David Hosansky, Future Battles Expected Over Pesticide Bill, 54 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 1759, 1759 (1996) [hereinafter Hosansky, Future Battles]. At that time, H.R.
1627's standard, see H.R. 1627 § 405, was similar to the standard in the bill's 1993 version,
see supra note 114, and contained neither the limitations on benefits considerations nor
the heightened standards for pesticides used on foods in children's diets that FQPA's final
version does. Compare H.R. 1627 § 405 (the standard in the 1995 version), with Food
Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, § 405, 110 Stat. 1489, 1514-35. See
also infra notes 140-56 and accompanying text (describing the standard in FQPA's final
version).
124. Hosansky, Future Battles, supra note 123, at 1759.
125. See Annie Tin, Pesticide Markup is Cut Short, 54 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1962,
1962 (1996). Congressman Waxman wanted to tighten the bill's "adequate to protect the
public health" standard. See David Hosansky, Long-Sought Pesticides Bill Advances Eas-
ily After Deal, 54 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2031, 2031 (1996) [hereinafter Hosansky, Long-
Sought Pesticides Bill]. For a description of the bill's original standard, see supra note
114.
126. Hosansky, Long-Sought Pesticides Bill, supra note 125, at 2031. The language in
the final bill instructs the EPA to approve only pesticide residue levels for which "there is
a reasonable certainty that no harm will result." 21 U.S.C.A. § 346a(b)(2)(A)(ii) (West
Supp. 1996); see also infra notes 143-47 and accompanying text (describing FQPA's stan-
dard). In addition to Congressman Waxman's position, the EPA advocated a "reasonable
certainty of no harm" standard, as opposed to the standard in the original bill. See Steven
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from both committees 417 to 0.27 The next day, the Senate Agricul-
ture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee approved the language of
the House bill unanimously, and the full Senate approved it by voice
vote with no debate."
In light of Congress's string of failed attempts to reform the De-
laney Clause, FQPA's swift and easy passage was a surprise."9
Several factors may have contributed to the Act's success. First, the
Les v. Reilly"13 decision cast doubt on the availability of a variety of
chemicals,' and the resulting "potential pesticide crisis" may have
finally spurred Congress to act.' Another incentive for Congress to
act may have been public opinion favoring environmental protec-
tion.'33 The Republican majority in Congress may have felt a
"'strong need for a victory in the environmental area'" going into
the 1996 elections. '3 Finally, advocates on all sides of the issue may
have simply been tired of debating it."5
III. THE FOOD QUALITY PROTECrION Acr
The Food Quality Protection Act of 1996136 amends portions of
both FIFRA and FFDCA. It revises FIFRA's re-registration proc-
ess' 37 and provides incentives for minor use, antimicrobial, and public
Gibb, 'Zero Risk' Era Ends as Congress Adopts 'Safe' Pesticides Policy, INSIDE EPA'S
RISK POL'Y REP., Special Report, July 26, 1996, at 1.
127. See David Hosansky, Rewrite of Laws on Pesticides on Way to President's Desk,
54 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2101, 2101 (1996) [hereinafter Hosansky, Rewrite On Way].
128. See id.
129. See id, (quoting a House Commerce Committee spokesperson as saying " 'I'm
going to check outside because hell's got to be freezing over,' " and a Senate Agriculture
Committee aide as saying" '[ilt's one of the signs of the apocalypse, I'm told' ").
130. 968 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1992). For a discussion of the Les v. Reilly decision, see
supra notes 93-100.
131. See David Hosansky, Quick Work on Pesticide Laws, 54 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP.
2032,2032 (1996) [hereinafter Hosansky, Quick Work].
132. Hosansky, Future Battles, supra note 123, at 2032.
133. See id
134. Gibb, supra note 126, at 1 (quoting "Congressional sources"); see also Hosansky,
Rewrite On Way, supra note 127, at 2101 ("GOP lawmakers were hungry for an election-
year environmental bill.").
135. See Hosansky, Quick Work, supra note 131, at 2032 (quoting an attorney with the
Natural Resources Defense Council who said that " 'a lot of people were getting sick of
it' " and various interest groups that thought "this is the best deal they're going to get").
136. Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489 (codified at 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 136-136y and 21
U.S.C.A. § 301-82 (West Supp. 1996)).
137. FQPA directs the Administrator to review pesticide tolerances under FFDCA in
conjunction with the EPA's re-registration review. See 7 U.S.C.A. § 136a-l(g)(2)(E)
(West Supp. 1996). It also requires the Administrator to periodically review pesticide
registrations, with the goal of reviewing registrations every fifteen years. See id.
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health pesticide development.138 FQPA's central feature, though, is
its new, uniform standard for pesticide residues in food.139
FQPA does not actually repeal the Delaney Clause, but rather
makes it inapplicable to pesticide residues by changing the definition
of "food additive" in FFDCA."' While FFDCA's old definition ex-
cluded residues in raw foods, but included residues in processed
foods, the amended definition excludes any "pesticide chemical resi-
due in or on a raw agricultural commodity or processed food."14' The
new definition of "food additive" renders FFDCA section 409, in-
cluding the Delaney Clause, inapplicable to all pesticide residues.
FQPA then creates a new uniform standard, replacing FFDCA
section 408, the old standard for residues in raw food, with FQPA
section 405, a new standard for pesticide residues in both raw and
processed food.'42 Under the new standard, the EPA Administrator
"may establish or leave in effect a tolerance for a pesticide chemical
residue in or on a food only if the Administrator determines that the
§ 136a(g)(1)(A).
138. Minor use pesticides are pesticides used on small crops (300,000 total acres or
less), or pesticides for which it is uneconomical to undergo the registration process. See 7
U.S.C.A. 136(//. Essentially, minor crops are everything but wheat, corn, soybeans, cot-
ton and rice, and include all fruits and vegetables. See Minor-Use Pesticides, 50 CoNG. Q.
ALMANAC 199, 199 (1994). FQPA creates incentives to encourage pesticide manufactur-
ers to seek registration of minor use pesticides by extending data submission deadlines
and allowing the Administrator to waive certain data requirements for minor use pesti-
cide applicants, expediting the review of minor use pesticides, and granting minor use
pesticide manufacturers prolonged exclusive use of the data submitted on behalf of their
chemicals. See 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 136a to 136a-1. FQPA also creates a minor use program,
under both the EPA and the Department of Agriculture, to coordinate efforts to develop
minor use pesticides. See id. §§ 136w-6 to 136w-7.
Antimicrobial pesticides are chemical sterilants or disinfectants designed to eliminate
bacteria, viruses, molds, and the like. See id. § 136(mm). FQPA facilitates the registra-
tion of these substances by exempting them from FFDCA's tolerance requirements and
instructing the EPA Administrator to develop other reforms to expedite their review. See
id. § 136a(h).
Public health pesticides are minor use pesticides that control mosquitoes, flies, rats,
and other vectors, or otherwise protect public health. See id. § 136(nn)-(oo). FQPA di-
rects the Administrator to weigh the risks and benefits of a public health pesticide
separately from the risks and benefits of other chemicals, and to take into account the
public health risks curtailed by the pesticide. See id. § 136(bb).
139. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 346a (West Supp. 1996).
140. See id. § 321(s).
141. Id. For the old definition, see 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (1994), amended by Food Qual-
ity Protection Act § 402(b), 110 Stat. at 1513.
142. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 346a. For old FFDCA sections 408 and 409, see 21 U.S.C.
§§ 346a, 348 (1994), amended by Food Quality Protection Act § 405, 110 Stat. at 1514-35;
see also supra notes 38-64 and accompanying text (discussing FFDCA's old regulatory
structure).
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tolerance is safe."'43 FQPA defines "safe" as "a reasonable certainty
that no harm will result from aggregate exposure to the pesticide
chemical residue."1" Like FFDCA's old standard, FQPA instructs
the EPA to consider "aggregate exposure" to a pesticide when set-
ting its tolerance,'45 but while FFDCA merely defined such exposure
as "the other ways in which the consumer may be affected by the
same pesticide chemical or by other related substances,"'46 FQPA is
more specific. It instructs the EPA to consider dietary and all other
non-occupational sources of exposure to the pesticide, as well as ex-
posure to other chemicals with "a common mechanism of toxicity."'4
When setting a tolerance, FQPA permits the Administrator to
adjust tolerance levels if there are competing public health or eco-
nomic considerations.' In other words, the Act establishes a risk-
benefit standard similar to that in FIFRA and in former FFDCA sec-
tion 408.14' FQPA allows the Administrator to set a tolerance above
the "safe" level for a residue if "[u]se of the pesticide chemical that
produces the residue protects consumers from adverse effects on
health that would pose a greater risk than the dietary risk from the
residue," or "[u]se of the pesticide chemical that produces the residue
is necessary to avoid a significant disruption in domestic production
of an adequate, wholesome, and economical food supply."'," How-
ever, FQPA places several limits on when and to what degree the
Administrator may relax a residue's tolerance. She may not permit
residues beyond the safe level for threshold effects,' and she may
143. 21 U.S.C.A. § 346a(b)(2)(A)(i).
144. Id. § 346a(b)(2)(A)(ii).
145. Id.
146. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b) (1994), amended by Food Quality Protection Act § 405, 110
Stat. at 1514-36.
147. 21 U.S.C.A. § 346a(b)(2)(D)(v)-(vi).
148. See id. § 346a(b)(2)(B).
149. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text (describing FIFRA's risk-benefit
standard); supra text accompanying note 45 and accompanying text (describing FFDCA
section 408's risk-benefit standard).
150. 21 U.S.C.A. § 346a(b)(2)(B)(iii)(I)-(1I). These benefits considerations are
broader than those in FFDCA's old standard, which merely instructed the EPA to con-
sider "the necessity for the production of an adequate, wholesome, and economical food
supply." 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b) (1994), amended by Food Quality Protection Act § 405, 110
Stat. at 1514-36.
151. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 346a(b)(2)(B)(i). Threshold health effects, like birth defects,
are effects for which a given level of exposure can be identified below which the effect
will not occur. See Junius C. McElveen, Jr., Risk Assessment in the Federal Government:
Trying to Understand the Process, 5 TUL. ENvTL. L.J. 45, 63-64 (1991). Traditionally, all
non-cancerous health effects have been considered threshold effects. See id. at 63 ("With
respect to substances that cause reversible effects, and, historically, with respect to sub-
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not relax a tolerance established according to FQPA's special provi-
sions for children. 2  Finally, the Administrator may not allow a
tolerance level that either increases the annual risk of a non-
threshold effect by more than ten times the level of risk permitted at
the "safe" level, or that increases the lifetime risk of a non-threshold
effect by more than twice the level of risk permitted at the "safe"
level."'
FQPA creates added safety measures for children. It requires
the Administrator to determine explicitly that a residue tolerance is
safe for children, based on information about the consumption pat-
terns of children and infants, their particular susceptibilities, and the
results of cumulative exposure to toxins."M Furthermore, FQPA di-
rects the Administrator to apply a "tenfold margin of safety" to the
safe level of a residue for threshold effects.155 The Administrator may
choose an alternative margin of safety, however, if "reliable data"
shows it is appropriate. "'
FQPA directs the EPA Administrator to review all old toler-
ances under the new standard, setting a ten-year schedule for
reviewing every tolerance issued under FFDCA prior to FQPA's pas-
sage.' FQPA also contains provisions aimed at harmonizing the
EPA's activities under FFDCA and FIFRA"5 Furthermore, FQPA's
stances that caused irreversible, noncancerous effects, the assumption has been that there
is a threshold below which adverse effects will not occur."). But see id at 64 (describing
the debate in the scientific community over whether irreversible health effects like cell
death or enzyme inhibition, caused by substances like lead, should be considered thresh-
old effects). Because exposure to any amount of a carcinogenic substance entails a risk,
however slight, of inducing cancer, cancer has been considered a non-threshold effect.
See Delaney Policy Statement, supra note 14, at 41,118 ("Cancer ordinarily is treated as a
non threshold effect."). But see McElveen, supra, at 65 (stating that "[t]he issue of
whether a 'threshold' exists for carcinogenesis is a controversial one"). This Note adopts
the traditional understanding of threshold and non-threshold effects.
152. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 346a(b)(2)(B)(vi). For a discussion of FQPA's requirements
for children, see infra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
153. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 346a(b)(2)(B)(iv). For example, assume that the Administra-
tor establishes the safe tolerance level for a given pesticide so that the pesticide's residues
in food present a 1/1,000,000 risk of inducing cancer. She then determines that the bene-
fits of the pesticide's use justify relaxing the tolerance. She may only relax the tolerance
to the point that exposure to the pesticide's residues over the course of the following year
presents a 1/100,000 risk of inducing cancer, or to the point that lifetime exposure pres-
ents a 11500,000 risk.
154. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 346a(b)(2)(C).
155. Id. In other words, once the Administrator determines the level of exposure at
which a pesticide residue causes no ill health effects, the Act requires the Administrator
to set the tolerance for that pesticide at one-tenth of the safe level.
156. See id.
157. See id § 346a(q).
158. See id. § 346a(o. FQPA's harmonization provisions essentially codify the EPA's
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new tolerance standard addresses two additional issues. The first is
the Delaney Clause's incompatibility with international pesticide
standards."' When setting a pesticide tolerance, the Act directs the
Administrator to determine whether a Codex maximum residue
level... exists for the chemical, and if the FFDCA tolerance differs
from the Codex level, the Administrator must "publish for public
comment a notice explaining the reasons for departing from the Co-
dex level. 61 The second issue is the dispute over national uniformity
of pesticide standards.' FQPA prohibits states from enforcing limits
on pesticide residues that differ from the EPA's tolerances, but this
prohibition only applies to tolerances set at the "safe" level; states
may enforce residue limits that differ from a federal tolerance ad-
justed due to benefits considerations.' Additionally, states may
request permission to set different standards if local conditions so
require, and they may set temporary standards in response to an
emergency.'"
regulations making FFDCA tolerances a condition of FIFRA registration. See Pesticide
Registration and Classification Procedures, 40 C.F.R. §§ 152.112(g), 152.113(a)(3),
152.114(c) (1996). If the Administrator revokes a tolerance under FFDCA, FQPA directs
her to take "any related necessary action" under FIFRA. 21 U.S.C.A. § 346a(O(1).
Likewise, if she suspends or cancels a pesticide's FIFRA registration, she must also re-
voke that chemical's tolerance under FFDCA. See id. § 346a(0(2)-(3). Finally, FQPA
directs the Administrator to set a FFDCA tolerance in accordance with an emergency
exemption registration under FIFRA. See id. § 346a(/)(6).
159. For a general discussion of the issue of harmonizing U.S. pesticide standards with
international standards, which is beyond the scope of this Note, see Christina M. Markus,
International Harmonization of Pesticide Tolerances-Legal, Procedural, and Policy Is-
sues, 47 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 701 (1992); Bartlett P. Miller, Note, The Effect of the GATT
and the NAFTA on Pesticide Regulation: A Hard Look at Harmonization, 6 COLO. J.
INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 201 (1990). The Delaney Clause's zero-tolerance standard for
carcinogenic pesticide residues in food was stricter than international pesticide tolerances,
known as Codex standards, adopted under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). See Miller, supra, at 216 n.117.
160. GATT adopted international pesticide tolerances known as Codex standards. See
Miller, supra note 159, at 215-16.
161. 21 U.S.C.A. § 346a(b)(4).
162. A complete discussion of this debate is also beyond the scope of this Note. For a
discussion of it, see Gregory J. Mertz, Note, Dead But Not Forgotten: California's Big
Green Initiative and the Need to Restrict State Regulation of Pesticides, 60 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 506 (1992) (advocating uniform national standards for pesticides). Concern over
the dangers of pesticides has prompted many states to consider standards more stringent
than those in federal pesticide laws. See id. at 507-08 (using as an example "Big Green," a
proposal in California that would have set very stringent limits on pesticide residues in
food grown, processed, or imported into the state). However, differing state standards for
pesticides may interfere with national and international trade. See id. at 509.
163. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 346a(n).
164. See id. § 346a(n)(5)-(6).
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE FOOD QUALITY PROTECTION AcT's RISK-
BENEFIT STANDARD
FQPA's most notable feature is its new standard for pesticide
residues in both raw and processed food. '65 Before granting a toler-
ance for a pesticide, the EPA must consider the dietary health risks
posed by its residues.'66 For all noncarcinogenic health effects, the
EPA may only approve a tolerance level that will not induce those
effects.' 7 However, when determining whether the cancer risk posed
by a pesticide residue is acceptable, the EPA conducts a risk-benefit
analysis considering not only the level of the risk, but also the chemi-
cal's benefits.'6 This approach is a significant change from the
Delaney Clause, which flatly prohibited many carcinogenic pesticide
residues, regardless of their level of risk or their value to society.6
Unfortunately, risk-benefit analysis also entails uncertainties that
may complicate EPA's tolerance-setting process.
A. The EPA's Risk-Benefit Analysis Process for Pesticides'70
The first step in risk-benefit analysis is to assess a pesticide's po-
tential risk. Risk assessment is "the characterization of the potential
adverse health effects of human exposures to environmental haz-
ards.'' It involves "the assembly, evaluation, and interpretation of
all pertinent scientific information about the toxicity, human experi-
ence, environmental fate, and exposure to a particular chemical or
165. See id. § 346a; see also supra notes 142-56 and accompanying text (discussing
FQPA's new standard).
166. FQPA directs the Administrator to determine whether the residues at the toler-
ance level are "safe," 21 U.S.C.A. § 346a(b)(2)(A)(i), defining "safe" as "a reasonable
certainty that no harm will result from aggregate exposure to the pesticide chemical resi-
due," id. § 346a(b)(2)(A)(ii).
167. For threshold effects, the Administrator must determine that the tolerance level
of exposure is "safe." See id. § 346a(b)(2)(B)(i)(III).
168. See id § 346a(b)(2)(B); see also supra notes 148-53 and accompanying text
(discussing FQPA's benefits provision).
169. See 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1994); see also supra notes 56-57 and accompanying
text (describing the Delaney Clause).
170. For a general description of risk-benefit analysis, see Zeckhauser, supra note 7.
For general descriptions of the risk-assessment process, see COMMISSION ON LIFE
SCIENCES, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS (1983) [hereinafter NRC, RISK ASSESSMENT];
McElveen, supra note 151. For a general description of EPA's benefit assessment proc-
ess, see GAO, BETTER DATA, supra note 2, RESOURCES, COMMUNITY, AND ECON.
DEV. DIV., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-91-52, PESTICIDES: EPA'S
USE OF BENEFIT ASSESSMENTS IN REGULATING PESTICIDES (1991) [hereinafter GAO,
BENEFIT ASSESSMENTS].
171. NRC, RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 170, at 18.
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physical agent."'" When assessing a pesticide residue's dietary risks,
the EPA follows the generally accepted procedure for risk assess-
ment, which consists of four steps: 1) hazard identification; 2) dose-
response assessment; 3) exposure assessment; and 4) risk characteri-
zation."
Hazard identification is the process by which researchers deter-
mine whether exposure to a given substance increases the risk of an
adverse health condition like cancer or birth defects. 4 Two impor-
tant methods used to identify potential health hazards are human and
animal studies. 5 Human studies attempt to establish an association
between human exposure to an environmental hazard and the occur-
rence of health problems by identifying hazards to which people are
exposed and looking. for corresponding incidents of health prob-
lems.'76 In contrast, animal studies are controlled laboratory studies
in which researchers expose animal subjects to a particular hazard,
measure any response, and extrapolate the results to humans.'" Re-
searchers may supplement the results of human and animal studies
with other evidence of health risks. For example, when attempting to
determine whether a substance is carcinogenic, they may compare
that substance's molecular structure with those of known carcinogens
and look for similarities.7 8 Also, since carcinogens are mutagenic,
researchers may test to determine whether a given substance is a
mutagen
7 9
Dose-response assessment uses the information revealed
through hazard identification to determine the level of exposure to a
hazard that will produce adverse health effects." Researchers at-
172. McElveen, supra note 151, at 47.
173. See NRC, RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 170, at 19-20.
174. See id. at 19 ("[Hazard identification] involves characterizing the nature and
strength of the evidence of causation.").
175. See McElveen, supra note 151, at 57.
176. See Sheldon Leigh Jeter, Note, The Role of Risk Assessment, Risk Management,
and Risk Communication in Environmental Law, 4 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 25, 30-32 (1995)
(describing both human and animal studies); see also NRC, RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note
170, at 20-22 (stating that human epidemiological studies provide "the most convincing
evidence about human risk").
177. See Jeter, supra note 176, at 31-32; see also NRC, RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note
170, at 22 ("The most commonly available data in hazard identification are those ob-
tained from animal [studies].").
178. See NRC, RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 170, at 23.
179. See id at 22-23. "Mutagenic" is defined as "capable of inducing mutation."
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICIONARY 1492 (1976). A "mutagen" is
"an agent.., that tends to increase the occurrence or extent of mutation." Id.
180. See McElveen, supra note 151, at 56; see also NRC, RISK ASSESSMENT, supra
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tempt to establish a relationship between exposure to a hazard and its
impact on human health that allows them to show the degree of risk
posed by various levels of exposure to the hazard."' The graphical
representation of this relationship is the dose-response curve." If
researchers' data are from human studies, researchers measure the
resulting health effects at the observed level of exposure and ex-
trapolate the results to other exposure levels, while researchers using
animal studies measure the different effects from various levels of
exposure and extrapolate the results to humans.'
Exposure assessment determines the overall level of human ex-
posure to a hazard. 4 Researchers either measure actual exposure
levels, or estimate exposure levels through the use of mathematical
models." Researchers may also attempt to identify particular sub-
groups of the population, such as pregnant women, who may be
especially vulnerable to a hazard.'"
Risk characterization, the final stage of risk assessment, deter-
mines the actual health risk posed by a given hazard in the
environment."' Having established the average amount of the hazard
to which the population is exposed (exposure assessment) and the
health response to various levels of exposure to the hazard (dose-
response assessment), researchers combine those determinations to
compute the overall health risk posed by the hazard.
While the EPA generally follows the four-step risk assessment
process when assessing pesticide risks, its procedure varies somewhat
depending on the nature of the health risk posed by a given chemical.
For all health effects other than cancer,'" the EPA uses dose-
response assessment to determine the highest level of exposure to a
note 170, at 19 ("Dose-response assessment is the process of characterizing the relation
between the dose of an agent.., and the incidence of an adverse health effect in exposed
populations and estimating the incidence of the effect as a function of human exposure to
the agent." (emphasis omitted)).
181. See NRC, RISK AssEsSMENT, supra note 170, at 23-27.
182. For an example of a dose-response curve, see id at 26.
183. See id. at 23-24.
184. See id. at 27; see also McElveen, supra note 151, at 67-72 (providing an in-depth
description of the exposure assessment process).
185. See NRC, RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 170, at 27.
186. See id. at 28.
187. See McElveen, supra note 151, at 72-73; see also NRC, RISK ASSESSMENT, supra
note 170, at 28 ("[Risk characterization is] the estimate of the magnitude of the public-
health problem.").
188. For a general description of the EPA's risk assessment process for non-
carcinogenic pesticides, see Delaney Policy Statement, supra note 14, at 41,118; NRC,
REGULATING PESTICIDES, supra note 54, at 31-33.
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pesticide residue resulting in no ill effect: the "no observed adverse
effect level" ("NOAEL"). 9 The EPA then divides the NOAEL by a
safety factor, usually 100, to account for uncertainties in extrapolat-
ing health effects in animals to humans and for differences in
sensitivities among individuals."'0 The adjusted NOAEL, referred to
as the Acceptable Daily Intake ("ADI") or the Reference Dose
("RfD"), represents the threshold level of safety for exposure to a
residue.191 After it calculates the ADI for a pesticide residue, the
EPA uses exposure assessment to identify the highest potential level
of human exposure to a pesticide residue, known as the "theoretical
maximum residue contribution" ("TMRC"). When calculating the
TMRC, the EPA assumes that a pesticide is used on all crops for
which the applicant seeks a tolerance and that the pesticide's residues
are present on every crop at the full level of the proposed tolerance. 93
Using food consumption statistics, the EPA multiplies a residue's
tolerance level for a particular food product by the amount of that
food in the typical diet.94 The EPA performs this calculation for
every food product on which the applicant proposes to use its pesti-
cide and the sum of those values is the TMRC.95 If a residue's
TMRC is less than its ADI, it is regarded as safe and the residue's
tolerance is approved.196 If the TMRC exceeds the ADI, the EPA
may nonetheless approve the tolerance, depending on a pesticide's
benefits,97 or explore with the tolerance applicant ways to reduce the
chemical's residues through less-frequent spraying.98
The EPA follows a different procedure for assessing a pesticide's
cancer risk. 99 Based upon the quality, adequacy, and consistency of
189. See Delaney Policy Statement, supra note 14, at 41,118.
190. See NRC, REGULATING PESTICIDES, supra note 54, at 32.
191. See Delaney Policy Statement, supra note 14, at 41,118.
192. See id.
193. See NRC, REGULATING PESTICIDES, supra note 54, at 32.
194. See Delaney Policy Statement, supra note 14, at 41,118.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See infra notes 215-20 and accompanying text (describing the EPA's benefits
consideration).
198. See NRC, REGULATING PESTICIDES, supra note 54, at 32-33. The EPA may also
attempt to estimate more accurately the actual residue levels in foods through data on
anticipated residues and the percentage of crops treated with the chemical. See Propi-
conazole; Pesticide Tolerances for Emergency Exemptions, 61 Fed. Reg. 58,135, 58,137
(1996) [hereinafter Propiconazole Tolerances].
199. For a general description of the EPA's carcinogenic risk assessment procedures,
see Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992 (1986) [hereinafter
Carcinogen Guidelines]. This variance in the EPA's approach to assessing risks stems
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the data revealed through hazard identification,' the EPA classifies
evidence of carcinogenicity into one of five groups: Group A-
Carcinogenic to Humans; Group B-Probably Carcinogenic to Hu-
mans; Group C-Possibly Carcinogenic to Humans; Group D-Not
Classifiable as to Human Carcinogenicity; and Group E-Evidence
of Non-Carcinogenicity for Humans' 1 If evidence of a pesticide's
carcinogenicity falls in Groups A or B, the EPA performs the re-
maining three stages of risk assessment on the residue.' If the
evidence falls in Group C, the EPA judges on a case-by-case basis
whether to continue the risk assessment.f3 Finally, if the evidence
falls in Groups D or E, the EPA deems the evidence insufficient to
justify further assessment of the residue's risk, and concludes that the
residue poses no risk of cancer.2m Once the EPA has determined to
proceed with a carcinogenic residue's risk assessment, it performs a
dose-response assessment of the residue. The EPA uses the informa-
tion gained through hazard identification2 5 to establish the dose-
response relationship for the residue.06 This relationship, the rate of
additional cancer incidents for each additional level of exposure to
the residue, is referred to as the residue's Cancer Potency Factor
(,,Q*,).207 The Q* value is the slope of the residue's dose-response
curve28 To account for potential errors in its calculation, the EPA
sets the Q* value so that 95% of the potential values within the cal-
culation's range of error fall at or below the Q* value.29
Furthermore, the EPA adjusts the Q* value to account for potentially
greater human sensitivity to the residue.1 A residue's Q* value is
also used to estimate the cancer risk from low levels of actual human
from the lack of a threshold level of exposure for carcinogenic effects. See supra note 151
(explaining threshold and non-threshold effects).
200. The EPA typically uses at least two animal test species, exposes them to various
high levels of the pesticide, and measures the resulting incidents of cancer. See Delaney
Policy Statement, supra note 14, at 41,118.
201. The EPA refers to this classification process as a "weight-of-evidence judgment."
See Carcinogen Guidelines, supra note 199, at 33,996.
202. See idU
203. See id. The EPA usually proceeds with risk assessment for a Group C chemical.
See id
204. See id.
205. See supra note 200 (describing the EPA's typical hazard identification tests).
206. See Delaney Policy Statement, supra note 14, at 41,118.
207. See NRC, REGULATING PESTICIDES, supra note 54, at 54 (explaining the Q*).
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. See Delaney Policy Statement, supra note 14, at 41,118 ("The effect of this ad-
justment is to increase the estimate of human risk by about thirteen fold where data are
derived from mice, and about 6 fold when the data source is the rat.").
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exposure to the residue.21 ' Additionally, the EPA assumes that the
relationship between exposure level and cancer risk is linear; that the
Q* rate is constant across all levels of exposure 12 The EPA's expo-
sure assessment process for a residue's cancer risk is identical to its
exposure assessment procedure for noncancer risks, in that the
Agency assumes maximum possible exposure to the residue. The
EPA then multiplies the resulting exposure level by a residue's Q*
value to arrive at the human cancer risk posed by a pesticide's resi-
due in food at the proposed tolerance level. 14
After the EPA has assessed a pesticide's risk, the next step in
risk-benefit analysis is to estimate the pesticide's benefits. Prior to
FQPA, when assessing the benefits of a pesticide as part of its toler-
ance-setting process, the EPA measured the economic impact that
would result if the pesticide was not available.215 It compared the
crop losses that would be prevented by the pesticide and the pesti-
cide's cost with the effectiveness and cost of other available
chemicals.216 The sum of the value of the increased crop yield and the
pesticide's cost savings, multiplied by the total acreage treated by the
pesticide represented that pesticide's overall benefits.1 This calcula-
tion reflected the EPA's narrow definition of the "benefits" of a
pesticide, focusing on "direct benefits to farmers and the food indus-
try. 218 FFDCA's old language gave the EPA the flexibility to define
benefits in this manner.219 However, the more detailed benefits lan-
guage in FQPA restricts the EPA's discretion. The Act now directs
211. See NRC, REGULATING PESTICIDES, supra note 54, at 54.
212. See McElveen, supra note 151, at 66.
213. See Delaney Policy Statement, supra note 14, at 41,118-19. The EPA assumes
that all crops are treated with the highest permissible level of a pesticide. See id.; supra
note 193 and accompanying text. But see supra note 198 (describing more accurate EPA
exposure assessment techniques).
214. See Delaney Policy Statement, supra note 14, at 41,118.
215. See GAO, BETTER DATA, supra note 2, at 3.
216. See id. at 19. The EPA refers to these two aspects of its benefit assessment proc-
ess as biological analysis and economic analysis. See GAO, BENEFIT ASSESSMENTS,
supra note 170, at 2.
217. See GAO, BETTER DATA, supra note 2, app. at 19. The EPA also considered the
national and regional impact of the loss of those benefits, as well as the impact that the
loss would have on "inflation, unemployment, and international trade." Id.
218. GAO, FOOD SAFETY, supra note 40, at 5-6.
219. See supra notes 45, 48-50 and accompanying text (discussing FFDCA's old bene-
fits provisions). Section 408 merely required the EPA to consider "the necessity for the
production of an adequate, wholesome, and economical food supply," 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)
(1994), amended by Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, § 405, 110
Stat. 1489, 1513-35, and section 409 allowed the EPA to consider appropriate "safety
factors," 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(5)(C).
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the EPA to consider not only the need for "an adequate, wholesome,
and economical food supply," but also how the pesticide "protects
consumers from adverse effects on health that would pose a greater
risk than the dietary risk from the residue." Thus, the EPA may
have to expand the scope of its benefit assessments to take this new
language into account.
Once the EPA calculates a pesticide's risks and benefits, the
Agency weighs the risks and benefits against one another to decide
whether a chemical's benefits justify tolerance approval, given the
health risks posed by the chemical's residues in food. The EPA "has
no formula to guide the balancing of a pesticide's benefits and
risks."22' Because of the lack of a strict analytic process, the decision
relies more on intuitive judgment. The EPA tends to restrict or
cancel pesticide uses that offer few benefits, while substantial benefits
may justify significant risks.'
In practice, the role of risk-benefit analysis in the EPA's toler-
ance-setting process has been limited.' When evaluating pesticide
residues for noncarcinogenic risks, the EPA rarely considers bene-
fits.' The Agency's practice has been simply to approve a residue's
proposed tolerance if the anticipated maximum level of human expo-
sure is below the lowest level of exposure at which health effects
occur." 6 If the maximum exposure exceeds the residue's safe level,
the EPA may consider benefits, or it may explore ways to reduce the
exposure level by changing the proposed uses of the pesticide. 7 For
carcinogenic pesticides, the Delaney Clause often denied the EPA
the opportunity to conduct risk-benefit analysis. Residues from car-
cinogenic pesticides that concentrated in processed foods were
absolutely barred by the Clause, so the EPA could only use risk-
benefit analysis on pesticides for raw foods that were never proc-
essed, or on pesticides that did not concentrate during processing. 8
220. 21 U.S.C.A. § 346a(b)(2)(B)(iii)(I) (West Supp. 1996).
221. GAO, BETTER DATA, supra note 2, app. at 19.
222. See Telephone Interview with David W. Brassard, Senior Entomologist, Office of
Pesticide Programs, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Oct. 11, 1996).
223. See GAO, BETTER DATA, supra note 2, app. at 19. For example, the EPA ap-
proved the chemical alachlor, which had a 6/1,000,000 risk of causing cancer, because
alachlor's benefits totaled between $400 and $500 million. See id.
224. See Id. at 3.
225. See NRC, REGULATING PESTICIDES, supra note 54, at 32.
226. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text; supra notes 215-20 and accompa-
nying text (describing the EPA's benefits consideration).
228. See 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1994); see also supra notes 56-57 and accompanying
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FQPA essentially codifies the EPA's existing practice for non-
carcinogenic health effects. Under FQPA, the EPA may approve a
tolerance level for a pesticide residue only if that level of the residue
will not induce noncarcinogenic health effects. 9 The only difference
is that now the EPA may never consider a chemical's benefits when
setting tolerances for noncarcinogenic effects.' However, FQPA
expands the role that risk-benefit analysis may play in setting toler-
ances for carcinogenic pesticides. The EPA is no longer constrained
by the Delaney Clause and may use risk-benefit analysis for any car-
cinogenic pesticide residue."'
The procedure that the EPA adopted under its short-lived de
minimis interpretation of the Clause provides insight into the
Agency's possible procedure under FQPA's new standard. 22 For a
pesticide residue posing less than a 1/1,000,000 risk of inducing can-
cer, the EPA approved its tolerance with "very little scrutiny" of the
pesticide's benefits. 3 For a pesticide residue with carcinogenic risks
greater than 1/1,000,000, the EPA adopted its tolerance only if a
"careful scrutiny of the projected benefits" from the pesticide's use
showed that the chemical's benefits outweighed its residue's risks.2
The Agency stated that "the higher the risk, the more thorough the
benefits evaluation that will be necessary."' 5 The EPA followed this
same process when setting tolerances for carcinogenic residues in raw
food under FFDCA section 408, to which the Delaney Clause did not
apply, but the Agency rarely granted section 408 tolerances for resi-
dues with carcinogenic risks greater than 1/10,000. "l6 Thus, the effect
of the EPA's tolerance-setting practice for carcinogenic residues was
to create a range of risk between 1/1,000,000 and 1/10,000 in which
text (describing the Delaney Clause).
229. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 346a(b)(2)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 1996) (stating that for threshold
effects, the Administrator must determine that at the tolerance level of exposure "there is
a reasonable certainty that no harm will result").
230. See id. § 346a(b)(2)(B)(i)(I) (stating that FQPA's benefits considerations may
only be used when setting the tolerance for a pesticide residue for which "the Administra-
tor is not able to identify a level of exposure to the residue at which the residue will not
cause or contribute to a known or anticipated harm to human health").
231. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text (discussing the applicability of
FQPA's new standard to all pesticide residues).
232. See generally Delaney Policy Statement, supra note 14, at 41,104 (describing the
EPA's risk-benefit analysis procedure under its de minimis exception to the Delaney
Clause).
233. lIL at 41,112.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See NRC, REGULATING PESTICIDES, supra note 54, at 34.
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the EPA would consider a pesticide's benefits.3 7
FQPA also establishes a range of carcinogenic risk in which the
EPA may consider a pesticide's benefits. However, the range is con-
siderably smaller than that previously used by the EPA. The EPA
first must determine what level of dietary exposure to a residue is
"safe." 8 Then, the EPA may only adjust its tolerance level to ac-
count for a pesticide's benefits to the point that the chemical's
residue poses ten times the risk at the safe exposure level over the
course of a year, or two times the safe exposure level over a lifetime
of exposure.39 Indications are that for carcinogenic risk, the EPA
will consider the safe level of exposure to be a level that poses no
more than a 1/1,000,000 risk of inducing cancer.24 If that is the case,
the range of risk in which the EPA may adjust a tolerance is between
1/1,000,000 and 1/100,000 if exposure to the risk only spans one year,
or between 1/1,000,000 and 1/500,000 for lifetime exposure to the
risk.
B. Potential Problems with FQPA's Risk-Benefit Standard
FQPA's new risk-benefit standard for pesticide residues offers
some advantages over FFDCA's old system. Risk-benefit analysis
provides greater flexibility to the EPA when setting pesticide toler-
ances241 and FQPA eliminates the problems posed by the Delaney
Clause.2' FQPA's standard applies to all pesticide residues equally,
as opposed to the paradoxical results of the FFDCA's old regulatory
structure.24 3 Additionally, the new standard removes the threat that
the Delaney Clause would eliminate a significant number of pesti-
237. See id.
238. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 346a(b)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1996). FQPA defines "safe" as "a
reasonable certainty that no harm will result from aggregate exposure to the pesticide
chemical residue, including all anticipated dietary exposures and all other exposures for
which there is reliable information." Id.
239. See i. § 346a(b)(2)(B)(iv).
240. See David Hosansky, Pesticide Bill Highlights, 54 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2104,
2104 (1996) [hereinafter Hosansky, Pesticide Highlights] (stating that a" 'reasonable cer-
tainty of no harm'" is "generally interpreted to mean that there be no more than a
[1/1,000,000] chance that the residue would cause cancer"). In the past, the EPA has
generally viewed any risk less than 1/1,000,000 as "negligible." See, e.g., Delaney Policy
Statement, supra note 14, at 41,112.
241. See NRC, REGULATING PESTICIDES, supra note 54, at 18-19.
242. See supra notes 65-80 and accompanying text (discussing the problems created by
the Delaney Clause).
243. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text (describing the "Delaney Para-
dox").
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cides and thus cause lower crop yields and higher food costs.2' Fi-
nally, the new standard may more effectively reduce dietary risks
with less impact on pesticide use.' However, FQPA's risk-benefit
standard may create some regulatory difficulties, stemming from in-
herent uncertainties in risk-benefit assessment that some of FQPA's
new requirements may complicate even further. 6 The problems with
risk-benefit analysis fall into four general categories: 1) data inade-
quacies; 2) methodological shortcomings; 3) disparate impacts; and 4)
ethical concerns.247
1. Data Inadequacies
The core problem in risk assessment is a lack of reliable data.48
The EPA has gaps in its knowledge about pesticides because infor-
mation on the effects of the wide variety of chemicals in use is
244. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text (describing the Clause's threat to
the food supply).
245. See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text (describing a study of the effective-
ness of the Delaney Clause compared to a uniform risk-benefit standard).
246. See Alan Schreiber, The Food Quality Protection Act: A Trojan Iceberg,
AGRICHEMICAL & ENVTL. NEWS, August 1996, at 4 (asserting that FQPA "could ulti-
mately have a much greater negative impact on the cost and production of food" than the
Delaney Clause); see also Letter from Lynn R. Goldman, EPA Assistant Administrator,
to Pesticide Registrants (Sept. 6, 1996) (on file with author) (providing interim guidance
for tolerance applicants under FQPA and warning that "additional time will be needed to
adequately review certain food use applications"). FQPA's new requirements include
more detailed consideration of aggregate impacts, see supra notes 145-47 and accompa-
nying text, expanded benefits considerations, see supra note 150 and accompanying text,
and special protections for children and infants, see supra notes 154-56 and accompanying
text.
247. For critical accounts of risk assessment, see Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming
Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 562 (1992) [hereinafter Hornstein, Normative Critique]; Howard Latin, Good Sci-
ence, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 89 (1988); Mark
Eliot Shere, The Myth of Meaningful Environmental Risk Assessment, 19 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REv. 409 (1995); Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (1995). Suggested alternatives to risk-based regulation of pesti-
cides include: (1) risk regulation based on priority-setting, see John S. Applegate, Worst
Things First: Risk, Information, and Regulatory Structure in Toxic Substances Control, 9
YALE J. ON REG. 277 (1992); (2) Integrated Pest Management, a multidisciplinary ap-
proach to controlling pests, see John Carlucci, Reforming the Law on Pesticides, 14 VA.
ENvTL. L.J. 189 (1994); and (3) a cause-oriented approach that focuses on preventing
pollution rather than regulating it after its creation, see Donald T. Hornstein, Lessons
from Federal Pesticide Regulation on the Paradigms and Politics of Environmental Law
Reform, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 369 (1993).
248. See NRC, RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 170, at 6. FQPA contains provisions
aimed at improving the EPA's pesticide data. See Food Quality Protection Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-170, §§ 301-305, 110 Stat. 1489, 1511-13 (codified in scattered sections of
7 and 21 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1996)).
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incomplete.' 9 The EPA also has poor information systems to keep
track of its pesticide data."' Furthermore, because of the Agency's
scarce resources,"1 it relies on data submitted by pesticide manufac-
turers and users, and it has little control over the accuracy this
information.25
Data shortages also result from uncertainties in every stage of
the risk assessment process." 3 At the hazard identification stage,
both human and animal studies have weaknesses. In human studies,
the level of exposure and the number of people exposed is often low,
creating a high level of uncertainty in the observed results.' The ob-
served results also may be skewed by exposure to multiple hazards
over which researchers have no control,25 and by problems with sub-
ject recall during interviews.25 Furthermore, the observed
association between exposure to a hazard and negative health effects
may be due to chance, rather than any causal connection.25 Uncer-
tainties in animal studies stem from the extrapolation of animal
response data to humans.28 The effects of a particular hazard on hu-
mans may be different than its observed effect on animals because of
biological differences between the species. 29
Dose-response assessment suffers from the uncertainties in-
volved in extrapolating the results of high-level exposure to a hazard
to lower levels of exposure. High-level exposure to a hazard may
overload animal metabolisms, overstating the true health effects re-
sulting from lower levels of exposure.' The EPA generally is unable
249. See NRC, RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 170, at 11-12.
250. See GAO, FOOD SAFETY, supra note 40, at 11-12. Information about pesticides is
"scattered across different nonintegrated systems or kept in paper files." Id. at 11.
251. See NRC, RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 170, at 11-12.
252. See GAO, FOOD SAFETY, supra note 40, at 13.
253. The overall effect of these uncertainties in the risk assessment process is that the
EPA "pile[s] uncertainty atop uncertainty," multiplying the potential inaccuracy of the
Agency's risk estimates. McElveen, supra note 151, at 100; see also Shere, supra note 247,
at 467-68 (describing the "stacking effect" of data uncertainties). For example, risk as-
sessments of vinyl chloride showed a million-fold variation. See id. at 439-40. Likewise,
saccharin, trichloroethylene, and polychlorinated biphenyls all had ten-million-fold varia-
tions in their assessed levels of risk. See id
254. See NRC, RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 170, at 20-22.
255. See id.
256. See McElveen, supra note 151, at 57-58.
257. See id.
258. See NRC, RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 170, at 20-22.
259. See id. at 22-27; see also McElveen, supra note 151, at 59-61 (providing a list of
the biological differences between humans and test animals).
260. See NRC, RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 170, at 24; see also Shere, supra note
247, at 437 (arguing that massive test doses also cause rapid cell division, which by itself
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to verify the accuracy of estimates based on high-level exposure be-
cause the extremely low risks that people face from actual exposure
levels are not subject to direct observation."1 Variations in individual
sensitivities also make it difficult to apply dose-response findings to
the general population.262
Finally, exposure assessments also rely on uncertain information,
including gaps in food consumption datae and food consumption es-
timates that "vary widely." '  Plus, exposure estimates "are
complicated by variations in diet and personal habits, 265 as well as by
variations in food storage and food preparation techniques." FQPA
may further complicate the EPA's efforts to measure exposure to
pesticide residues by requiring the Agency to consider aggregate ex-
posure to pesticides, 7 as well as the special dangers that pesticides
pose for children and infants. 8 It is unclear whether the EPA will be
able to assemble information about all non-occupational sources of
exposure to a pesticide and all chemicals similar to it," and the
EPA's uncertainty about food consumption in the general population
may make it difficult for the Agency to specifically account for food
consumption by children and infants. 7
The EPA's benefit assessment process also suffers from data in-
sufficiencies which limit the effectiveness of benefit assessments in
increases the rate of cancer and may explain the observed incidents of cancer in test ani-
mals).
261. See Shere, supra note 247, at 440.
262. See NRC, RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 170, at 23-27.
263. See GAO, FOOD SAFETY, supra note 40, at 7.
264. NRC, REGULATING PESTICIDES, supra note 54, at 57.
265. NRC, RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 170, at 27.
266. See id.
267. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text (describing FQPA's aggregate
exposure requirements).
268. See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text (describing FQPA's requirements
for assessing the risks of pesticides in the diets of infants and children).
269. An example of the EPA's uncertainty about aggregate exposures is its assessment
of the pesticide propiconazole's tolerances in conjunction with the chemical's emergency
exemption registration under FIFRA. See Propiconazole Tolerances, supra note 198, at
58,135. FQPA requires the EPA to issue a tolerance before a pesticide may receive an
emergency exemption under FIFRA. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 346a(l)(6) (West Supp. 1996). In
addition to propiconazole residues in food, people may be exposed to the chemical
through groundwater contamination, or through the chemical's use as a wood preserva-
tive. See Propiconazole Tolerances, supra note 198, at 58,138. However, in assessing the
risk posed by propiconazole, the EPA concluded that it lacked data on these sources of
exposure to the chemical. See id
270. The EPA does have testing methodologies for exploring the impacts of pesticides
on infants and children. See Propiconazole Tolerances, supra note 198, at 58,138-39
(describing the EPA's "developmental toxicity studies").
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Agency decision-making." The EPA lacks complete information on
the quantity of pesticides used on crops2 and the effects of pest con-
trol alternatives on crop yields.2" The EPA's tolerance-setting
process under FQPA depends not only on this incomplete informa-
tion about pesticide use and crop yields, but also on information
about the health risks that consumers would face without a given pes-
ticide.274
2. Methodological Short-Comings
Because of the data uncertainties detailed above, the EPA must
make a number of assumptions throughout its risk assessment proc-
ess that affect its risk estimates.275 Because these assumptions tend to
be conservative, some contend that they lead to over-burdensome
requirements on pesticides.276 However, other aspects of the EPA's
risk assessment process may understate risks.2'
In the hazard identification stage, for example, the EPA bases its
evaluation of the probable carcinogenicity of a pesticide on qualita-
tive judgments about the sufficiency of the evidence of the chemical's
health effects.2 7' This process involves medical judgments that may
271. See GAO, BETTER DATA, supra note 2, at 4 (asserting that "benefit assessments
are not meeting their full potential to help refine the agency's regulatory decisions").
272. See id. at 5. For example, estimates of ethylene bisdithiocarbamate usage, a fam-
ily of fungicides, varied by 20%. See id.
273. See GAO, FOOD SAFETY, supra note 40, at 8 (stating that the EPA "pieces to-
gether whatever information it can"); see also GAO, BETTER DATA, supra note 2, at 5
(describing the EPA's reliance on questionable data).
274. See supra note 150 and accompanying text (describing FQPA's expanded benefits
considerations).
275. See NRC, RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 170, at 28-36 (identifying a number of
inferences that risk assessors must draw throughout the process); see also Shere, supra
note 247, at 413 (stating that the typical risk assessment "consists of about fifty separate
assumptions and extrapolations").
276. See McElveen, supra note 151, at 100. The EPA uses conservative estimates to
account for gaps in information and uncertainties about health effects. See NRC,
REGULATING PESTICIDES, supra note 54, at 32. These conservative assumptions "may
overstate adverse health risks by factors of ten to 1000." Carol S. Curme, Regulation of
Pesticide Residues in Foods: Proposed Solutions to Current Inadequacies Under FFDCA
and FIFRA, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 609,618 (1994).
277. For example, the Agency does not consider the risks from possible synergistic
effects of a chemical. See GAO, FOOD SAFETY, supra note 40, at 5. Synergistic effects
stem from the interaction of two or more chemicals, which may produce greater effects
than the sum of the effects that the chemicals produce separately. See Shere, supra note
247, at 438.
278. See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text (describing the EPA's "weight of
evidence" evaluation).
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be beyond the expertise of EPA personnel 9
Dose-response assessments also contain a number of assump-
tions. When the EPA proceeds with the dose-response assessment of
a carcinogenic pesticide, it assumes that the relationship between the
level of exposure to the chemical and the risk of cancer incidence is
linear.' However, the true shape of the dose-response curve is un-
known." Furthermore, the EPA uses a number of safety factors for
both carcinogenic and noncarcinogenic pesticides that may overstate
health risks m For example, the Agency adds additional uncertainty
to its carcinogenic risk estimates by applying a safety factor based on
the size difference between humans and test animals?2 For noncar-
cinogenic pesticide residues, the EPA's hundred-fold safety factor for
a residue's ADI value makes the ADI a very conservative estimate."
FQPA increases this safety factor even further.for residues in foods
commonly consumed by children.m
Finally, the EPA's exposure assessments assume that the highest
possible level of a pesticide residue is present on every food for which
the pesticide is approved.m However, "[s]uch high and widespread
residue concentrations are rare in reality."" Few pesticide chemicals
"are used on anywhere near 100 percent of the total acreage of a crop
grown in the United States, and measured residues are usually below
the tolerance." m Even the EPA acknowledges the shortcomings of
its theoretical maximum residue concentration assumption."
The EPA's benefit-assessment methodology also contains weak-
nesses. When comparing a pesticide's performance and cost to
alternative pest control options, the Agency only considers other pes-
ticides, not nonchemical pest control alternatives that may be
279. See Shere, supra note 247, at 431.
280. See supra note 212 and accompanying text (describing the EPA's assumption).
281. See NRC, RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 170, at 24.
282. See supra notes 190, 209-10 and accompanying text (discussing the EPA's safety
factors).
283. See Shere, supra note 247, at 438.
284. See NRC, REGULATING PESTICIDES, supra note 54, at 32; see also supra notes
189-91 (discussing ADI).
285. See supra notes 154-56 (discussing FQPA's safety provisions for children).
286. See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text (describing the EPA's "theoretical
maximum residue contribution" calculation). But see supra note 198 (describing more
accurate EPA exposure assessment techniques).
287. Shere, supra note 247, at 466.
288. NRC, REGULATING PESTICIDES, supra note 54, at 32.
289. See id at 60 ("The agency has acknowledged for a long time the shortcomings of
this method.").
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cheaper and more effective. 29' By doing so, the EPA may overstate a
pesticide's benefits.29' Conversely, the Agency understates benefits
by not considering the possible health and environmental ramifica-
tions from the use of an alternative chemical."
3. Disparate Impact
A third concern about risk assessment is that it does not reflect
the potentially disproportionate risk that a hazard may pose for sub-
groups of the general population, particularly poor and minority
communities.293 These communities may face higher risks from haz-
ards in the environment because they are exposed to higher levels of
toxics than the general population, and they may be more susceptible
to the health risks associated with that exposure.294
Poor and minority communities experience heightened exposure
to toxics because there tend to be more sources of toxins in such ar-
eas.295 Individuals in these communities may be exposed to a higher
level of a given hazard, so an assessment of that hazard based on its
risk to the general population may not accurately reflect the risk
faced by members of poor and minority communities.296 Further-
290. See GAO, BETTER DATA, supra note 2, at 8-9. The EPA believes that farmers'
most likely alternatives are other pesticides. See id.
291. See GAO, FOOD SAFETY, supra note 40, at 6.
292. See id. FQPA addresses this shortcoming by requiring the EPA, when assessing a
pesticide's benefits, to consider the health risks averted by the pesticide. See 21 U.S.C.A.
§ 346a(b)(2)(B)(iii)(I)-(II) (West Supp. 1996) (allowing EPA to set a tolerance above the
"safe" level for a residue if public health or economical food production would be more
jeopardized by not approving the pesticide).
293. See generally Marion Moses et al., Environmental Equity and Pesticide Exposure,
9 TOXICOLOGY & INDus. HEALTH 913 (1993) (discussing the disparate impact of pesti-
cide risks and recommending greater resources to study the problem); Brian D. Israel,
Student Article, An Environmental Justice Critique of Risk Assessment, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 469 (1995) (discussing the disparate impact of environmental risks in general). But
see Lynn E. Blais, Environmental Racism Reconsidered, 75 N.C. L. REv. 75 (1996)
(critiquing the environmental justice movement). FQPA attempts to address this issue by
requiring the EPA to consider "the variability of the sensitivities of major identifiable
subgroups of consumers" when setting pesticide tolerances. 21 U.S.C.A.
§ 346a(b)(2)(D)(vii). This requirement, however, may further complicate the EPA's
tolerance-setting process.
294. See Israel, supra note 293, at 494-509. Migrant and seasonal farm workers, the
majority of whom are people of color, face higher levels of exposure to pesticides than
any other population group. See Moses et al., supra note 293, at 914. The health prob-
lems that migrant and seasonal farm workers face from disproportionate exposure to
pesticides are exacerbated by limited data on their health conditions and under-reporting
of pesticide poisoning. See id. at 915, 938-39.
295. See Israel, supra note 293, at 496-97.
296. See id. at 496-501.
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more, members of such communities may be exposed simultaneously
to higher levels of numerous hazards, multiplying the overall level of
risk that they face 2 7 and exacerbating the hazards' synergistic ef-
fects.28
Members of poor and minority communities also may face
higher risks because of their increased susceptibilities.299 Population
subgroups have varying genetic characteristics that may make them
more sensitive to toxics.3" Plus, repeated exposure to toxics may cre-
ate characteristics that increase sensitivity. 1  The frequency of
diseases like hypertension, diabetes, liver disease, tuberculosis, and
asthma that may make an individual more susceptible to toxic poi-
soning also varies by race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status."
Furthermore, problems like poor health care and nutrition that are
associated with low-income communities may worsen the effect of
toxics? 3 Finally, lifestyle differences like higher pregnancy rates and
increased alcohol and tobacco use may make members of poor and
minority communities more susceptible to environmental hazards?"
4. Ethical Concerns
Risk-benefit analysis entails a number of ethical concerns. The
first is the extent to which non-scientific factors may influence the
process. Risk assessment encounters external pressures from Con-
gress, the general public, and the regulated community" Due to the
uncertainty in the risk assessment process, policy inevitably plays a
role.3 Because risk assessment "can be used to justify almost any
result that is sought,"'' it may give EPA too much discretion and
297. See id. at 496-97; see also Moses et al., supra note 293, at 915 ("People of color are
more likely to have multiple simultaneous and sequential exposures to pesticides.").
298. See Israel, supra note 293, at 497-500. Risk assessment fails to account for syner-
gistic effects. See supra note 277.
299. See Israel, supra note 293, at 503-09.
300. See id at 504-05.
301. See id. at 505; see also Moses et al., supra note 293, at 937-38 (describing
"multiple chemical sensitivity syndrome").
302. See Israel, supra note 293, at 506-07.
303. See id. at 507-08; see also Moses et al., supra note 293, at 915 ("Lack of access to
and unavailability of adequate health care contribute significantly to the impact of envi-
ronmental contamination."). Farm workers' poor living conditions intensify the effects of
their exposure to pesticides. See id. at 921.
304. See Israel, supra note 293, at 508-09.
305. See NRC, RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 170, at 13-14.
306. See i at 48-49.
307. Junius C. McElveen, Jr. & Chris Amantea, Legislating Risk Assessment, 63 U.
CIN. L. RaV. 1553, 1579 (1995).
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open up the process to political influence."' This problem may be
particularly acute when the EPA considers a pesticide's benefits
along with its risks. The fear is that the EPA may use a chemical's
benefits to justify its approval regardless of the level of risk.'
A second ethical concern is that the results of risk and benefit
assessments seem more certain than they actually are."' The appear-
ance of scientific certainty may conceal the assumptions and policy
decisions that underlie the process. 1' Consequently, members of the
public may lose the opportunity to influence those policy decisions.312
Furthermore, the appearance of certainty may discourage scientific
scrutiny of the process's assumptions.3"3
A further concern is the dichotomy between expert and public
perceptions of risk. The general public often perceives risks differ-
ently than experts do.314 The public tends to view risks "qualitatively
rather then quantitatively," and to fear risks that are involuntary, un-
familiar, or lead to "dreaded physical effects," like cancer.3 5
Therefore, a level of risk that experts categorize as safe may still be
unacceptable to the public.36 This dichotomy is especially problem-
atic when regulators compare risks, because regulators and the public
may disagree over the relative seriousness of risks.1 7
Finally, risk-benefit analysis involves the very complicated mat-
ter of valuing a human life.38 Risk assessors have several methods for
308. See Curme, supra note 276, at 632.
309. See id. at 643-44 (suggesting that limits be placed on the ability of risk assessors to
consider benefits). FQPA does limit the extent to which the Administrator may adjust a
pesticide's tolerance based on the chemical's benefits. See supra notes 151-53 and accom-
panying text.
310. See GAO, BErER DATA, supra note 2, at 7 (recommending that the EPA com-
municate the uncertainties in its risk and benefit assessment processes more effectively).
See generally Wagner, supra note 247 (discussing the "science charade" in risk assess-
ment, its causes, and its consequences).
311. See Wagner, supra note 247, at 1628-31.
312. See id. at 1674-77.
313. See id& at 1685-88.
314. See Jeter, supra note 176, at 26-28.
315. Id. at 27-28.
316. See id. at 27.
317. For a general discussion of risk comparison, see Hornstein, Normative Critique,
supra note 247; Ellen K. Silbergeld, The Risks of Comparing Risks, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
405 (1995). FQPA instructs the EPA to compare risks for certain pesticides. It directs
the EPA to weigh a pesticide's risk of inducing cancer against the "adverse effects on
health" that the pesticide seeks to prevent. 21 U.S.C.A. § 346a(b)(2)(B)(iii)(I) (West
Supp. 1996).
318. For example, under FQPA, to compare a pesticide's risks and benefits, the EPA
must place a value on the chemical's risk to human life (inducing cancer).
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making this valuation. Besides simply choosing an arbitrary value,
these methods include: (1) invested value, based on the total value of
all resources needed to sustain a human life; (2) productive value,
based on the average individual's discounted future earnings; and (3)
surrender value, based on the amount of money that people are will-
ing to pay to avoid risks."9 All of these methods entail concerns, such
as valuing life based upon a person's economic status.320
V. CONCLUSION
The Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 addressed a long-
standing problem in federal pesticide regulation. The Act's risk-
benefit standard for pesticide residues in food replaced the Delaney
Clause, which prohibited tolerances under FFDCA for pesticides that
might induce cancer, no matter how slight the risk or how important
the chemical. FQPA gives the EPA flexibility to consider the seri-
ousness of a carcinogenic pesticide's dietary risk, as well as the
pesticide's benefits to society when making tolerance decisions.
However, FQPA's risk-benefit standard replaces the impracti-
cality of the Delaney Clause with the uncertainties inherent in risk-
benefit analysis. Informational and methodological shortcomings
cast doubt on the accuracy of EPA assessments, and risk-benefit
analysis raises social and ethical concerns as well. Because many of
FQPA's new, more detailed requirements are subject to these same
uncertainties, they may further complicate the EPA's tolerance-
setting process.
FQPA's true impact is unclear. 2' The EPA is embarking on a
transitional period during which it will begin to implement FQPA's
requirements." It remains to be seen whether the EPA can fully ad-
319. See Jay Michaelson, Note, Rethinking Regulatory Reform: Toxics, Politics, and
Ethics, 105 YALE L.J. 1891, 1916-18 (1996). Risk assessors may avoid directly valuing a
human life by "(1) comparing risks to others popularly accepted, (2) regulating up to a
point of diminishing returns, or (3) balancing lives saved against lives lost in regulation."
Id at 1913. However, these non-pricing methods are so inaccurate as to be "effectively
useless in practice." Il at 1916.
320. See id'
321. One commentator dubbed FQPA the "Trojan iceberg" because "[jiust as 90% of
an iceberg cannot be seen, so will much of the impact of the act remain unknown" until
the EPA issues its regulations. Schreiber, supra note 246, at 4 (stating that the impact
may not be known "for several years").
322. At the time of publication of this Note, the EPA had just issued its Implementa-
tion Plan for FQPA. The Plan identifies FQPA's new standard and requirements for
pesticide tolerances, and summarizes the agency's initial implementation strategy for each
of FQPA's major provisions. See PREVENTION, PESTICIDES AND TOXIC SUBSTANCES,
U.S. EPA, 1996 FOOD QUALITY PROTECTION ACT IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (1997)
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dress the uncertainties surrounding FQPA so that the law truly im-
proves pesticide regulation.
ScoTT DOUGLAS BAUER
(available on the Internet at <http://www.epa.gov/opppsps/fqpa/impplan.pdf>).
